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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to argue for a new metric for determining the moral status of 
another being. Determining this status is of foundational importance in a number of legal, 
political, and ethical concerns, including but not limited to animal rights, the treatment of 
criminals, and the treatment of the psychologically afflicted. This metric will be based upon 
one’s capacity to morally consider others. In other words, in order to have full moral status, 
one must be able to have moral concern for others and act upon this concern to even a 
minimal degree. In doing so, one will be considered to belong to a “moral community”, 
which affords the member a certain set of rights, privileges, and duties towards other 
community members. Arguing for the existence of such a community achieves the 
pragmatic aspect of this thesis. I argue that morality is geared towards group-survival 
strategies which have been evolutionarily selected for, and thus by organizing societal 
structures towards the tools which nature has armed us with, we may maximize the 
powers and capacities of the community members. 
 In order to achieve these aims, I defend a concept of morality as based in emotion, 
requiring certain neurological structures, which gives the first set of criteria for identifying 
potential members of the moral community. I then discuss the issue of identifying the 
capacity for morality in non-human minds, arguing that we may infer moral capacities from 
behaviourism. 
 In summary, the findings of this paper are that first, morality is essentially emotional 
in nature and is a product of the nature of our neurological system, although rational 
processes and enculturation shape particular moral sensitivities and priorities. Second, 
one can infer the existence of moral capacities in animals from their behaviour, and, at risk 
of engaging in anthropomorphism, to deny these capacities completely entails solipsism. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, those who are capable of morally considering others ought 
to be afforded full moral status themselves and be brought into a “moral community” 
wherein special rights, freedoms, and privileges allow the members to most efficiently 
contribute to the community, maximizing the powers and benefits of the community. 
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Abstrak 
Die doel van hierdie tesis is om ’n nuwe maatstaf voor te hou waarvolgens die 
morele status van ’n ander wese bepaal kan word. Die bepaling van hierdie status is van 
fundamentele belang vir ’n hele aantal regs-, politiese en etiese aangeleenthede. Dit sluit, 
onder andere, diereregte, die behandeling van misdadigers en die behandeling van 
diegene met sielkundige probleme in. Hierdie maatstaf sal gebaseer word op die vermoë 
van die individuele wese om ander moreel in ag te neem. Met ander woorde om volle 
morele status te hê, moet 'n wese daartoe in staat wees om moreel besorg te wees oor 
ander en om, ten minste tot ’n minimale mate, na gelang van hierdie besorgheid op te tree. 
Op grond hiervan kan daar aanvaar word dat daardie wese tot ’n “morele gemeenskap” 
behoort, wat ook aan hom ’n stel regte, voordele en pligte teenoor ander 
gemeenskapslede sal besorg. Om ’n argument vir die bestaan van só ’n gemeenskap te 
maak sal die pragmatiese doelwit van hierdie tesis bereik. Ek argumenteer dat moraliteit 
ingestel is op groepsoorlewingstrategieë wat evolusionêr geselekteer is. Dit wil sê deur 
samelewingstrukture op só ’n wyse te organiseer dat dit gebruik maak van die gereedskap 
waarmee die natuur ons bewapen het, sal ons die bevoegdhede en die vermoëns van 
gemeenskapslede kan maksimaliseer.  
 Om hierdie doelwitte te bereik, verdedig ek ’n verstaan van moraliteit as gebaseer 
in emosies wat sekere neurologiese strukture benodig. Dít verskaf die eerste stel kriteria 
waarvolgens potensiële lede van die morele gemeenskap geïdentifiseer kan word. Ek 
bespreek vervolgens die moontlikheid om die vermoë tot moraliteit in nie-menslike 
verstande te identifiseer en argumenteer dat morele vermoëns vanuit gedragsleer afgelei 
kan word.  
Ter opsomming is die bevindinge van hierdie tesis, eerstens, dat moraliteit wesenlik 
emosioneel van aard en ’n produk van ons neurologiese sisteem is, alhoewel rasionele 
prosesse en verkulturering spesifieke morele sensitiwiteite en prioriteite vorm. Tweedens 
kan die bestaan van morele vermoëns in diere afgelei word vanuit hulle optrede, en, 
alhoewel ons hier die risiko van antropomorfisme loop, behels die ontkenning van hierdie 
vermoëns solipsisme. Derdens, en die belangrikste, diegene wat daartoe in staat is om 
ander moreel in ag te neem behoort self volledig morele status toegeken te word. Hulle 
word sodoende in die “morele gemeenskap” betrek waar spesiale regte, vryhede en 
voordele gemeenskapslede sal toelaat om op die mees effektiewe wyse tot die 
gemeenskap by te dra om sodoende die bevoegdhede en voordele van die gemeenskap 
te maksimaliseer.  
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1. Introduction 
On what grounds do we consider another subject to be worthy of moral consideration? The 
term “moral consideration” will receive more in-depth discussion in section 3.3 in this 
thesis. For the moment, let us simply say that it entails “the avoidance of harm and the 
promotion of care”. When, then, ought we invest time and resources into caring for others 
and avoid causing them harm? This thesis is aimed at answering this question. I will argue 
that, on pragmatic grounds, the capacity for the moral consideration of others is itself the 
primary justification for incorporating others into a community of moral concern. In doing 
so, I will argue, the moral community will be able to reap considerable pragmatic rewards 
via maximizing the members’ usefulness to society. 
While an idealist may disagree with this position and prefer to answer that subjects 
are always worthy of moral consideration, throughout the natural world we often observe a 
necessary life/death dependency between two or more species where such concern is not 
possible. Indeed, death appears to be as much a part of life as birth, and one can hardly 
begrudge a lion for eating an antelope; it is a necessary consequence of the nature of the 
lion and the nature of the antelope. While this is a statement of that which is, some would 
argue that this is not what ought to be.  
The question of how one ought to treat others has been the subject of much debate 
over the centuries, and has formed and informed many pertinent issues such as the 
raising and eating of animals, the treatment of criminals, the extent to which abortion is 
legal and so forth. This debate has come by many names such as the “moral standing” of 
an individual, their “moral status”, and “moral considerability” (Jaworska & Tannenbaum, 
2013). I will be using the latter terminology in this thesis. 
The common-sense notion of moral considerability suffers from numerous 
contradictions. Jaworska and Tennebaum point out that while there is general consensus 
of affording full moral consideration to human beings, whether cognitively impaired or not, 
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there is a great deal of disagreement when it comes to non-humans. This is so even 
though providing an acceptable theory that unambiguously accounts for all humans 
without also incorporating many animals has been a problematic task (ibid.)1  
To be morally considerable, or to have moral status, bears with it the three 
suppositions. The first is the presumption against interference, which is akin to the 
avoidance of harm although it has the broader implication that you may not interfere with 
another even if there would be no harm. However, this presumption may be overridden in 
special cases, especially where interference is necessary to prevent harm to others (ibid). 
The second presumption is that of rendering aid to those who are morally considerable – 
to promote care. This presumption is not as stringently held as the first, possibly because 
rendering aid usually comes at a cost to oneself, while non-interference merely requires 
restraint. The third supposition for those of full moral status is that they ought to be treated 
fairly. This is not the same as saying they ought to be treated equally, although given 
equal need and no other differentiating considerations, the treatment ought to be so 
(Jaworska & Tannenbaum, 2013). In my model of moral consideration, I hope to show that 
we have a real, pragmatic motivation for ensuring that these three suppositions for those 
who are worthy of moral consideration are adhered to. 
Of course, before we can go about promoting these suppositions, we need a clear 
understanding of what criterion (or criteria) is needed for one to be morally considerable. 
We can categorize the justifications for moral status into two camps: it is either a matter of 
degrees, or an all-or-nothing account. Jaworska & Tannenbaum note that while some 
theorists acknowledge that moral considerability may be a matter of degree, none have 
managed to develop a detailed account of what each degree might require or provide. In 
the earliest drafts of this thesis, I initially intended to provide such an account, however it 
                                                             
1The reason as to why we intuitively favour the human species is thought to be an evolutionarily encouraged 
practice of kin-selection which may be overgeneralized through anthropomorphism. This will be discussed 
further in chapter 3. For a detailed discussion of this selection-bias, refer to Rushton et al.’s excellent 1984 
research article Gene Similarity Theory: Beyond Kin Selection. 
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proved to be a larger and more complex model than could be presented in thesis. 
Nonetheless, in the concluding chapter I leave some suggestions in how one might build 
such a model. 
Many models of moral considerability are reliant upon the subjects’ cognitive 
capacities for their justification (ibid). For example, we might say “I can eat this beef 
because cows are stupid”, and let us assume that they are indeed so. However, where 
might this leave newborns, or the mentally handicapped? May we then eat them too? To 
defend against this, some will make what is known as the “potential account”, where the 
future potential cognitive capacities of the subject factor into its considerability. This 
potential account is one which I will also advocate. Since my argument is a pragmatic one, 
it is concerned with future benefits which potential capacities will eventually feed into. 
However, at what point would one not be smart enough to be morally considered? We 
might have some scalar quantification – the more intelligent a being is, the greater their 
worthiness – or we might hold a threshold view, that as soon as one demonstrates some 
intelligent capacities one is awarded full moral status (ibid). In this thesis I will endorse a 
threshold view, although I will also offer a possible method to adjust the model to a scalar 
model. 
Let us take a look at the modern vegan movement as an example of some the 
above ideas. It argues that human beings are not the only animal worthy of moral 
consideration. This is communicated in various ways, most overtly through the PETA 
slogan “animals are people too”. It is also communicated more subtly by 
anthropomorphising animals; in one series of advertisements by PETA, a calf is shown 
walking through a meadow, while a child-like narrator’s voice states “one day I will be big 
and strong, just like my dad” before cutting to scenes of a slaughterhouse. 
Putting aside the assumption of the exact nature of a cow’s consciousness, this 
suggests that certain characteristics are required for a subject to be considered worthy of 
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moral consideration. As mentioned above, intelligence has been the metric by which we 
often measure this worthiness (Singer, 1997: 17, 20, 22; 2006: 18), and arguing for the 
intelligence of a given species is the strategy by which they are afforded certain privileges 
above that of other non-human animals. An example of this would be the Great Ape 
Project, a campaign that has found political traction in both England and Spain to grant 
chimpanzees and other higher primates access to legal and moral rights on par with those 
of humans (Cavlieri & Singer, 1993: 104-106). 
This move to incorporate animals into an expanding sphere of moral concern is a 
modern departure from the traditional paradigm of humans-separate-from-nature (Vining, 
et al., 2008: 1, 8). This traditional paradigm has been deeply ingrained into Western 
thinking, particularly in the Abrahamic religions as is evidenced from the Christian Bible: 
Then God said, "Let us make mankind in our image, in our likeness, so that they 
may rule over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky, over the livestock and all 
the wild animals, and over all the creatures that move along the ground. 
(NIV, Genesis 1:26) 
Here it is apparent that the human being is thought of as having an element of the divine 
because of being made “in His image” – that is, to have certain God-like qualities 
(Botterweck & Ringgren, 1997: 259), as opposed to the non-divine animals. This divinity 
was bestowed upon humankind for the purpose of having mastery over the other forms of 
life. This paradigm of separation is not unique to western thought either. Teffo and Roux 
describe the hierarchy of African metaphysics as “God at the apex and extra-human 
beings and forces, humans, the lower animals, vegetation and the inanimate world, in this 
order, as integral parts of one single totality of existence” (2003: 167). But it is not only on 
religious grounds that the paradigm has come about. Richard Dawkins states: 
It isn’t just zoological classification that is saved from awkward ambiguity only by 
the convenient fact that most [intermediate species] are now extinct. The same is 
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true of human ethics and law. Our legal and moral systems are deeply species-
bound. 
(1996: 262) 
 
This humans-separate-from-nature paradigm is termed “speciesism”. The philosopher and 
advocate for the veganism movement Peter Singer defined speciesism as “a prejudice or 
attitude of bias in favour of the interests of members of one's own species and against 
those of members of other species” (2002: 6). 
 In contemporary discourse, words like “prejudice” have become loaded with 
negative connotations. However, the true concern, I believe, is not with the prejudice itself, 
but rather the unjustifiable discrimination. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, we will use 
the more nuanced definition of speciesism offered by Fjellstrom: 
A normative opinion O, held by a person P, is speciesist if, and only if 
(i) O favours at least the normal members of P' s own species, against the 
normal members of all other species; 
(ii) O is, in P's intellectual milieu, not grounded –or grounded on validational 
tools that assure the favouring of P’s own species; and 
(iii) No high level meta-ethical justification is offered in P' s milieu of the 
criteria used that is not implausible to philosophical common sense, in 
particular by being non-partial. 
(2002: 71) 
This definition is preferred to Singer’s, as under Singer’s stipulation there is no possibility 
for dissent for any reason. That is, it automatically assumes that a speciesist act is at all 
times an arbitrary act that cannot be justified. Fjellstrom’s definition allows for a dialog of 
ideas to take place, it does not presume its own truth. 
The anti-speciesism of Dawkins and Singer does not stand unopposed. It is 
countered by Daniel Dennett, who argues that consciousness is not a binary opposite as is 
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commonly understood; that is to say, an organism either has the capacity for sapient, self-
aware consciousness or it does not (1995: 694-696). Rather, he argues, consciousness is 
a construct brought about by the formation of data—a structuralist approach that suggests 
human culture is a key factor in the understanding and awareness of the self (ibid). The 
implication of this view for Singer, whose position on animal rights is chiefly concerned 
with suffering (Singer, 2002: xxi, 7, 8), is that it is nonsensical to argue for the equal 
consideration of suffering when the experience of suffering itself is unequal. In Dennett’s 
own words: “Such body-protecting states of the nervous system [reflexive pain] might be 
called ‘sentient’ states without thereby implying that they were the experiences of any self, 
any ego, any subject. For such states to matter -- whether or not we call them pains or 
conscious states or experiences -- there must be an enduring, complex subject to whom 
they matter because they are a source of suffering.” (1995: 711) Dennett further points out 
that any descriptions of pain as being intrinsically awful is “circular and question begging” 
(Newman, 2014: 7). 
However Dennett’s position only provides a potential counter to arbitrary or 
undifferentiated speciesism where Fjellstrom’s point (iii) is not taken into account, such as 
the belief that an ant is equal in all respects to a chimpanzee and ignores aspects like 
intelligence, social mechanics, or emotional capacities, and only deals with the nature and 
capacity to suffer.  
It is possible that there exists a species other than human beings which satisfies 
Dennett’s requirements2 for consciousness. It is thus my aim to provide a pragmatically 
normative framework that can be applied to any conscious subject and is not necessarily 
limited to human beings. 
                                                             
2 Dennett has been criticized for not providing concise requirements for consciousness (Newman, 2014: 6), 
however he has described it as being necessarily a massively parallel process of sensory input and 
interpretation which creates “something rather like a narrative stream or sequence” (1991: 135, original 
emphasis). 
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The concern over how to measure a subject’s worthiness of moral consideration 
extends beyond the realm of animal rights. Robert Freitas, Carl Sagan, and others 
involved in astronomy and space exploration have written extensively on the problem of 
contact with extraterrestrials; not merely on the issue of communication, but on how two 
wildly different species would view, consider, and understand one another. Furthermore, 
this issue can also be applied to artificial intelligences as evidenced by various works of 
speculative fiction such as Isaac Asimov’s The Bicentennial Man, and Philip K. Dick’s Do 
Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, the basis for the 1982 movie Blade Runner.  In these 
works the question of personhood, moral responsibility, freedom, and access to moral 
resources is applied to machine intelligences as well. While we may be some decades 
away from such an electronic facsimile of human consciousness—and sceptics such as 
Searle believe that we may never achieve it (Cole, 2014)—it does nonetheless broaden 
the question to include even potentially non-biological forms of consciousness.  
The examples and case studies presented in this thesis will come from the field of 
animal behaviourism and the animal rights debate, since we have not yet come into 
communication with alien or machine intelligences. Despite that, I would like to stress that 
it is not my intention for this to be a thesis on the issue of animal rights, but rather on the 
question of both ethical and practical treatment and communication between different 
consciousnesses, even within the human species. Is it morally permissible to use a 
psychopathic human being – who has not committed a crime – as a means to end, for 
example? If we create a sentient computer program are we morally compelled to keep it 
powered? If we ever come in contact with an alien race who, through the very biological 
structure of their brain cannot take the perspective of another, would we be able to 
establish a social community with them that goes beyond economic concerns?  
In this thesis I aim to provide the meta-ethical grounds from which we may reap 
some answers for the above questions. Before I do so, I will begin by answering two 
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questions upon which my thesis is based, namely, what is morality, and who owns it? To 
answer the first question, in Chapter 2 I will discuss the metaphysics of morals: those 
particular features which identify a given property or argument as belonging to the moral 
sphere.  This discussion will mostly rely upon recent neurobiological research, as well as 
work in psychology and sociology. I will argue that morality is neither purely rational nor 
purely emotional, but is rather an emergent property of these two mental processes. I will 
also argue that morality is chiefly a biological artefact, subject to shaping through 
sociological forces, but primarily a matter of biology and a product of evolutionary forces. 
The second question, “Who owns morality?”, will be answered in Chapter 3. While it 
may seem a strange question to ask, it will become apparent in the second chapter that it 
is commonly held belief that morality is exclusively a human trait, and that to see it in 
animals is grave error of judgement. Thus Chapter 3 will necessarily also deal with the 
problem of anthropomorphism. In this chapter I will argue that morality exists beyond 
humanity, that it can be found in birds, bees, and chimpanzees (among others). However, I 
will also argue that not all morality is equal. I will argue that the “morality” of bees, known 
as kin-altruism, is self-serving. I will also argue that while birds are capable of a “true” 
altruism, its scope is so narrow as to make it effectively useless to a moral community. 
It is in this discussion of the birds and bees that another important capacity will be 
discovered: that of targeted helping. Targeted helping is in itself not a moral trait; it is the 
capacity to identify the cause of another’s suffering, create a strategy to alleviate the 
suffering, and hold the ability to execute the strategy. While this is the bedrock of 
intentional altruistic behaviour, it is also the bedrock of trade and certain forms of 
manipulation. Nevertheless, in order for the moral community to achieve its maximum 
pragmatic and utilitarian potential, targeted helping will be a prerequisite to for membership 
to such a community. 
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With these three concepts in hand – what morality is, who might have it, and how 
one uses it – I will present my main argument in Chapter 4. Ultimately I wish to show that, 
in describing and classifying our actions and interactions, there exists a special 
community, a “moral community”. Those who fall within this moral community are those 
who we see as fellow beings whose freedoms, ambitions, fears, and hopes are treated 
with a similar degree of respect as our own. With the broadest strokes of the brush we can 
say that beings in this moral community may not be treated as a means to an end, but only 
as ends in themselves (Kant, 2002: 46-47).   
In ancient times moral communities and cultural communities were 
indistinguishable: the Romans raided and enslaved barbarians just as the barbarian tribes 
raided and enslaved the Romans. However, with the progression of technology the world 
has become increasingly cosmopolitan where cultural influence has less and less to do 
with national borders, and the French and Italians may happily rub shoulders in Shanghai. 
In short, the gamut of humanity has been largely incorporated into a single moral 
community. 
Of course one might point out that people still engage in slavery, in genocide, in 
rape, and many other activities which undermine the value of beings inside the moral 
community. Certainly these terrible things occur, but we do not regard those who 
perpetrate such crimes as belonging to the moral community. As such, we engage these 
threats to the moral community in a markedly different manner to how we would deal with 
a momentary transgression from a member of the moral community. A psychopath, for 
example, who commits multiple murders may be given the death penalty, while a spouse 
who has been cheated on and kills in a fit of jealous rage may be given ten years of 
imprisonment3.  
                                                             
3 One could read this as an endorsement of capital punishment, and indeed the idea of a moral community 
may lend weight to such an endorsement. However, in the interests of full disclosure I would like to point out 
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This point highlights why I decided on the particular term “community” over other 
possible terms, such as “class” or “group”. Firstly, communities are not necessarily 
groupings of equals. In the economic community of a town – an analogy I will return to 
often in this thesis – the doctor may produce more valuable economic goods than the 
janitor, but both are capable of the give/take actions which are fundamental to the 
existence of the economic community itself. Likewise in a moral community a child 
suffering from Down’s syndrome might not be able to comprehend the complexities of 
Kant’s or Hume’s moral theories, but is still able to perform the essential avoidance of 
harm/promotion of care behaviours required for a moral community to exist. Secondly, 
communities promote themselves as a whole while either utilizing elements outside of 
themselves to their own advantage or removing outside threats. Thirdly, a community is 
often better defined by its interactions within itself than its interactions with elements 
outside itself, and since this is a question of moral behaviour, the term is most fitting. 
Communities, however, are not ever-inclusive. As with my above analogy of the 
town, one cannot belong to the moral community without being able to contribute to it, 
even if only at a minimal level. Thus the boundaries of the moral community are set at 
those beings that are able to morally consider others. This is a point that distinguishes my 
thesis from the position of many animal rights activists – the issue of animal rights being 
inextricably tied to this discussion, as I mentioned earlier.  
Philosophers such as Singer would argue that we ought to promote care and avoid 
harming any being capable of forming preferences (1993: 94-97; 1997: 206, 275; 2002: 9), 
preferences which are based on the being’s ability to suffer, regardless of its moral 
capacities. However this I believe to be erroneous on two points: firstly, in terms of utility it 
makes no sense to invest in something which will never reciprocate; and secondly, in that 
an over-commitment of finite resources provides sub-optimal benefit and even has the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
that there are numerous arguments against capital punishment which I believe considerably outweigh this 
apparent endorsement. 
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potential to harm as I will argue in Chapter 4. There is a considerable difference between 
giving ten dollars to one beggar, or one dollar each to ten beggars. Both acts cost me 
equally, yet only in one scenario can anyone afford a meal. 
So long as supply falls short of need, we must make decisions as to how to invest 
limited resources. My thesis is that it is ultimately to the maximum benefit to most sentient 
beings to invest in the moral community. Further, since members would be of the sort who 
seek to improve the world for others, the moral community may even be in the interests of 
beings outside the community in the long term. 
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2. Defining the Moral Domain 
2.1 Introduction 
According to Gert (2011), the term “morality” can be used either 
1) Descriptively, to refer to certain codes of conduct endorsed by a culture, society, or 
by an individual for their own behaviour, or 
2) Normatively, to refer to certain codes of conduct that, in certain contexts, would be 
put forward by all rational persons. 
While this thesis posits a pragmatic normative claim, that we ought to only have moral 
concern for subjects with moral capacities, it is a claim that rests on descriptive moral 
properties. To that end, this chapter is dedicated to defining the moral domain.  
 “Certain codes of conduct” which Gert offers is a very vague definition for what 
constitutes moral behaviour. As we will see in this chapter, moral behaviour exhibits 
certain properties that set it apart from legal, religious, or social codes of conduct. It is the 
elucidation of these properties that constitutes “defining the moral domain”. In this way, if 
we encounter some belief of a culture that we do not hold as a moral belief, we can still be 
able to recognize it as being so from the perspective of that culture. 
 The analysis of the moral domain will be broken down into four sections. Some of 
the issues raised are centuries old, while others are recent additions from the fields of 
neuroscience and animal behaviourism. We will first consider whether moral beliefs are 
primarily constituted by rational beliefs, as Kant believed, or emotional beliefs, as Hume 
argued. We will then consider whether morality is a “cultural veneer” that can be washed 
away as T.H. Huxley and Jesse Prinz believe, or if it is a core biological process as Darwin 
and F.W. de Waal believe. Once these structural elements of morality have been explored, 
we will then look at the broad categories or “dynamics” which define the form that moral 
beliefs take.  
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2.2 The duel between emotionism and rationalism 
Whether morality is derived from rational or emotional processes is a debate well-known to 
philosophy. Two exemplars of this debate are Kant and Hume, with Kant supporting 
rationalist theories and Hume widely considered to be the forbearer of the emotivist4 
movement. Until recently both moral philosophy and moral psychology have been 
dominated by some permutation of the rationalist model, with less attention being given to 
emotivism (Greene et al., 2004: 389; Haidt, 2001: 814; Kohlberg, 1969: 512, 530; Turiel, 
1983: 42, 168). This question is of particular importance to this thesis as it will answer the 
question as to what can be said to be capable of morality, and thus belong to the moral 
community. For example, should a true artificial intelligence be created, but be incapable 
of emotions, could it be capable of moral agency? 
A rationalist metaphysics of morals makes the claim that morality is constituted by 
claims that are supported by rational premises. These premises are in a sense publicly 
observable, in that they are not subjective mental events like emotions, and are open to 
scrutiny for truth-value. Moral rationalism thus usually entails moral objectivism, where a 
moral claim can have a definite Boolean value as either true or false.  
Emotivist moral theories are based on the idea that moral judgments do not entail 
statements about the state of the world; rather they are expressions of our attitudes. Thus 
to make declaration “stealing is wrong” is no different to cry “stealing!” in revulsion (Prinz, 
2007: 17). Strictly speaking then, “morality” is a special case of emotional reactions and 
not an independent concept. For Hume, one of the earliest and perhaps most iconic 
emotivists, the nature of these reactions are predicated on the basis that ideas, including 
moral ideas, are “stored copies of sensory impressions” (2007: vii). It follows then that the 
                                                             
4 I will use the terms “emotivism” and “emotivist” to generally refer to the schools of thought and their 
advocates which identify the emotions as the primary property of moral beliefs, even where some schools 
may refer to themselves with their own nomenclature, such as Prinz’s “Constructive Sentimentalism” (2007: 
167-169). This discussion is more concerned with the primacy of the emotions or of rationalism in morality, 
and not the nuances involved. 
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ideas of “goodness” and “badness” are the result of the sentiments of approbation and 
disapprobation – the positive and negative impressions respectively – we experience when 
performing the relevant acts. 
More recently, emotivist theories have garnered further support from moral 
psychology with the development of the CAD Triad Hypothesis.. The aim of the study was 
to map three principle emotions - contempt, anger, and disgust - to three principle moral 
paradigms - community, autonomy, and divinity respectively (Rozin et al., 1999: 574). That 
is to say, a threat to a person’s autonomy such as personal insults, theft, or assault, would 
elicit anger in the victim. Seeing a transgression of communal codes, including social 
hierarchy – such as seeing a teenager begin eating at the dinner table before everyone 
else is served – arouses contempt for the transgressor. The principle of divinity is also 
referred to as the principle of purity, and is theorized to have had evolutionary origins in 
disgust or distaste for disease or rotten food (578). An example of a transgression of 
divinity or purity would be an act of incest. Contempt, anger, and disgust, the authors 
argue, are the primary colours from which we paint our varied pictures of morality across 
cultures (575). 
In the study, conducted separately in Japan and the United States, participants 
were asked to match a variety of scenarios, including moral transgressions, to appropriate 
facial expressions (576-577, 579). For example, the “anger” facial expression featured 
narrowed eyes, a furrowed brow, and pursed lips.5 The authors found a great degree of 
similarity between the American and Japanese responses. In the given situation of a 
teenager eating at a dinner table before the rest of the family is served, 75% of American 
interviewees identified “contempt” as the appropriate reaction, as did 73% of Japanese 
interviewees (578).   
                                                             
5 While the study also asked the participants to match situations to emotional words, the authors admit that 
certain subtleties between English and Japanese may have skewed results (Rozin et al. 1999: 581). 
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The results showed that the “moral emotions map rather cleanly onto three different 
moral codes”, even across the cultural divide between the US and Japan. Had these 
emotional responses been a matter of cultural conditioning, the predicted result would be 
divergence between cultural borders, not similarity. Rozin et al.'s research thus indicates 
the existence of an apparently culturally-independent, emotionally-based moral structure 
(585).  
While emotivist theories have been enjoying empirical support in recent years, 
rationalist theories have been unable to account for a number of behavioural anomalies 
found in anthropology, primatology, and biological psychology (Haidt, 2001: 814). Among 
these anomalies is the ubiquity of morality and moral behaviours. If morality is a product of 
rationalization, Andrew Sneddon (2007: 735) argues, then only those who have engaged 
in the necessary thinking and discourse would be capable of moral behaviour, and yet 
moral behaviour is so commonplace. Further, there has been research to show that violent 
and sociopathic behaviours are greatly increased when a child is raised in an “emotionally 
malicious” home, regardless of education or propensity towards rationality (Poulshock, 
2006: 31). 
In an attempt to establish a new descriptive moral paradigm to account for these 
anomalies, the Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) was developed as an affective, intuitionist-
based model of moral judgment which minimizes, although does not eliminate, the function 
of rational processes in moral judgements. Here rational processes are effectively reduced 
to secondary, post-hoc processes of rationalization. The SIM thus predicts rational thinking 
only occurs after the moral judgment has been rendered as post-hoc reason-giving. 
Jonathan Haidt, the developer of the SIM, argues that the issue of morally dumbfounding a 
person serves as evidence for an intuition-based judgment system (Haidt, 2007: 998; 
Prinz, 2007: 30). When a person is morally dumbfounded they claim that a given action or 
situation is morally impermissible, while being unable to give reasons why.  
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In an experiment, Haidt (2001:814) asked participants if it was morally permissible 
for two siblings on holiday in France to commit an act of incest, even when every form of 
protection was taken, and the act was kept a secret which actually strengthened their 
relationship. Eighty percent of respondents claimed it was morally impermissible, but when 
pressed for reasons, could not provide any. In a similar study, Prinz (2011: 3) asked 
participants if it was morally permissible for a paedophile to fondle an infant, even if the 
infant was not physically or psychologically harmed in any way, and would not even 
remember the incident. One hundred percent of respondents stated that it was 
impermissible. Prinz, unfortunately, did not stipulate whether he asked for reasons. 
However, I strongly believe very few people would be able to respond with anything other 
than “it just is!” This implies that there is some given set of moral beliefs that are 
emotionally rooted and not initially motivated by rationality. The question arises, however, 
do the emotivist explanations of morality given by Haidt and Prinz describe the complete 
set of all moral beliefs? 
If the answer to this question is negative, then we ought to be able to demonstrate 
that moral dilemmas are, at least at times, resolved rationally, as this will fall outside of the 
scope of predictions of Haidt’s and Prinz’s theories. In order to achieve this we need to first 
identify a category of responses to moral dilemmas that can be reliably classed as 
rationalist, then we need to find one or more moral dilemmas where respondents apply this 
category of solution. 
A good candidate for a rationalist moral system seems to be utilitarianism. The 
commitment to doing what creates greatest benefit for the greatest number of subjects will 
eventually call for an adherent to resist his or her own emotional urges and perform the 
calculated optimum action. There are two empirical studies which demonstrate 
utilitarianism to be a rationalist mode of moralizing. The first is Greene et al.’s 2004 
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) scans of brain activity during moral 
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deliberations (2004: 393-395). In this study, the timing and activity levels in the anterior 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (anterior DLPFC, the region of the brain involved with 
abstract thinking) of patients making utilitarian responses and non-utilitarian responses to 
given moral dilemmas were compared. Volunteers were presented with moral dilemmas 
such as the trolley dilemma and the crying baby dilemma6. Higher activity in the anterior 
DLPFC was detected with the utilitarian responses, and higher activity in the emotional 
and social centres of the brain for the non-utilitarian responses (Greene et al., 2004:393-
394). This suggests that utilitarian morality is fundamentally rational in nature, and 
deontological morality is situated in a social-emotional matrix7. 
With regards to the timing of activity in the anterior DLPFC, in utilitarian responses 
activity was relatively high—up to ten seconds before a response was given—and was the 
highest at the point of response before falling back to normal readings (ibid.) For non-
utilitarian responses, however, anterior DLPFC activity was below normal and in fact 
dropped sharply at the point of response, only to increase to above-average levels eight to 
ten seconds after the response. This late increase of rational activity complies very well 
with Haidt’s SIM, which predicts intense rational processes only after a moral judgment is 
made as post-hoc defence and rationalization, something which is not necessary if the 
response was achieved by rational processes, as is the case with the utilitarian responses. 
This suggests that the intuitive responses here followed a model similar to what is 
predicted in the SIM. Contrary to the SIM, however, the increase in activity in the anterior 
                                                             
6 In the crying baby dilemma, you and several others are hiding in a house which enemy soldiers are 
searching. They will kill you if they do find you. Your baby begins to cry, and the option is to smother your 
baby, saving your group but killing the infant (the utilitarian option), or through inaction allowing the soldiers 
to find your group (the non-utilitarian, deontological option). In the standard trolley dilemma originally 
formulated by Foot (1967) – there are many important variants – an out of control railway trolley is speeding 
towards five railway workers. You are standing near a control switch that will shift the course of the trolley 
onto tracks that will hit one railway worker. To switch the tracks reduces the number of deaths, entailing a 
positive utilitarian choice, but you become an active agent in the death of another, entailing a negative 
deontological choice. 
7 One might argue that the Kantian categorical Imperative is both rational and deontological in nature. I do 
not believe this to be entirely true. Consider the first maxim of universality. If we are deliberating whether or 
not to engage in an extramarital affair, and imagine a world where affairs are universal, it may very well be 
our emotional reaction to that imagined world that informs our reply to the first maxim. Such an interpretation 
is probably not what Kant intended, and I wish to be cautious of accusing Kant of being in error, but the 
possibility does exist. 
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DLPFC prior to the utilitarian responses suggests that these moral judgements were a 
product rational processes without post-hoc rationalization. 
The second study which demonstrates the rationalist nature of utilitarianism was 
conducted by Fumagalli et al. (2010). The experiment involved transcranial direct current 
stimulation as a non-invasive method for inducing stimulation in the ventral prefrontal 
cortex, which houses the anterior DLPFC, which performs high-order rational thought, in 
an attempt to alter the proportion of utilitarian judgments made by participants (Fumagalli 
et al., 2010). This research was inspired by a comment made by Greene et al. who stated 
that it is possible that the nature of their fMRI tests may have caused participants to try 
and “push through” to a rational response, thus distorting the results (2008: 1151). Greene 
et al. hypothesized that a less intrusive technique such as transcranial direct current 
stimulation8 – the selective excitation or impairment of specific groups of neurons in the 
brain – would avoid such a problem and provide more accurate results. 
It was found that area of speciality in education – life science vs. human science –  
had no significant effect in the favouring of utilitarian decisions, nor did religious upbringing 
(Fumagalli et al.: 4) 9. However, all of the volunteers were educated to at least tertiary 
level, so this does not answer any questions on the relation between quantity of education 
and utilitarian judgment. What did play a major role was the sex of the volunteer: 
transcranial direct current stimulation, whether anodal or cathodal, had no effect in altering 
the proportion of utilitarian to non-utilitarian judgments in men. In women, when tDCS was 
applied in the excitatory, anodal mode over the prefrontal cortex, utilitarian decisions 
became significantly more common and were made more quickly (ibid.) Unlike the male 
                                                             
8 Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), or the related technique of Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation 
(TMS), is a relatively safe method of altering functionality of a particular region of the brain using weak 
electric currents or magnetic waves, respectively. The alteration could be inhibitory in the cathodal mode: by 
hyperpolerizing neurons into a positively charged state, it makes it impossible for the neurons to fire properly, 
effectively a temporary brain lesion (Gazzaniga, et al. 2014: 89). tDCS or TMS can also be done in the 
anodal state, bringing the resting state of the neurons closer to the voltaic threshold needed to fire, and thus 
improving performance in the affected area (ibid.) 
9 This might suggest that our moral conduct is innate, and not so much a taught cultural veneer. This 
question is looked at more closely in the next section. 
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subjects, who were unaffected, cathodal tDCS caused far fewer utilitarian decisions, and 
those that were made too much longer to make (3) 10.  
These results are puzzling to say the least. One might predict, on the hypothesis 
that utilitarianism is a rational process, a decreased response time for utilitarian thinking as 
it was the rational region of the brain that was primed. And yet, while this prediction was 
confirmed, there was also a reduced response time for non-utilitarian judgment which was 
not anticipated. The only speculative explanation for this is that the stimulation of the 
rational centres of the brain pushed borderline or ambiguous cases over to a rational 
response, allowing for only the most definitive emotional responses to overpower rational 
responses, which would allow for more rapid reaction times. As for the discrepancy 
between men and women, the authors do not attempt to explain it beyond pointing out that 
it exists, and stating that it may explain why men tend to be more involved in criminal 
activity than women (5) 11 12. This is quite a telling conclusion if we accept their theory. In 
the experiment, women were more prone to emotional responses than men, even after the 
transcranial stimulation. The implication here being that feeling about morality is better 
than thinking about morality when it comes to actually acting morally. Regardless, taken in 
themselves, the results on the women test subjects shows utilitarian thinking to be 
rationalist in nature.  
We have seen that to be a utilitarian is to be a rationalist. But is utilitarianism a 
normative code of conduct only, or can it be a descriptive theory of how we usually engage 
with moral dilemmas? 
                                                             
10 That a matter of biology would have such a glaring effect on our moral conduct further suggests morality 
as an innate process. The fact that other social influences such as type of education or religious background 
does not change one’s responses is also indicative of an innate morality, rather than a socially instituted one. 
11 I can only hazard a guess that either the male brain does not respond to the exact techniques and settings 
used in the experiment, or that utilitarian deliberation occurs in a different region for men. 
12 Their statement on the relation between utilitarianism and criminality is based on what I infer is an 
unstated assumption that calculating utility is not necessarily an other-directed task. In other words, the 
ability or propensity to calculate the optimal outcome in a given situation is likely to be selfish or egotistical 
action unless we have some motivation – such as empathy – to care for the outcome of others. 
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Studies by Greene et al. (2001; 2004; 2007; 2008; 2009; also Paxton & Greene, 
2010) incorporating fMRI scans, thinking about moral dilemmas under a cognitive load13 
and reaction tests, seem to suggest a dual-process model of moral judgment. The two 
processes are those of moral reasoning and emotional responses, which are managed by 
a “conflict monitor” (Paxton & Greene, 2010: 514). This conflict monitor is hypothesized to 
be the anterior cingulate cortex, whose role is to detect conflicts in thoughts and beliefs – 
such as conflicting emotional and rational judgments – and to select or mediate an 
appropriate response (ibid.) Greene’s model holds rational processes to be vital and 
fundamental in making moral judgments. If this is the case, then Haidt’s and Prinz’s 
models do not describe the complete set of all moral beliefs. 
In the 2001 study, Greene et al. compared responses between two variants of the 
trolley dilemma. In the standard dilemma an out-of-control railway trolley is speeding 
towards five workers who are bound to the tracks. You are near a control switch that would 
divert the trolley onto another path, where only one worker is tied to the tracks. When 
presented with this scenario, most people approve of the utilitarian action, pulling the 
control switch to alter the course of the trolley, condemning one person to death to save 
five (Greene et al. 2001: 2105). In the footbridge variant, both you and a worker wearing a 
heavy backpack are on top of a footbridge that spans the tracks. The combined weight of 
the worker and the pack are enough to stop the trolley, but there is not enough time for 
you to take the pack from him. Despite the apparent popularity of utilitarian judgments in 
the standard version, in this instance very few people chose to push the worker off the 
footbridge in order to save five lives (ibid.) 
Greene et al. conducted a second experiment, modelled on the first, testing three 
factors in the trolley/footbridge dilemma: physical contact, spatial proximity, and personal 
                                                             
13 Put simply, a cognitive load is a distracting task that requires concentration, such as the Stroop task. In the 
Stroop task subjects must say aloud the colour of the ink a word is written in, and not the word itself. For 
example, “RED” may be in written in green ink, making the correct response “green”. 
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force. Greene denotes personal force as follows: “The force that directly impacts the other 
is generated by the agent’s muscles, as when one pushes another with one’s hands or 
with a rigid object” (Greene et al., 2009: 365). For example, in one scenario used in the 
experiment “Joe” uses a pole to push a worker off of the footbridge, which is negative for 
physical contact, but positive for personal force. 
The experiment revealed that spatial proximity played no statistically significant role 
in judging the moral appropriateness of an action (366-367). In fact, there was a small 
increase in the number of utilitarian responses when Joe uses a switch to drop the worker 
on to the tracks, but is standing close by when he does so (negative for contact and force, 
positive for proximity) (ibid.) Of the three factors tested, the most significant was personal 
force, followed by physical contact, with spatial proximity playing no significant role. 
The lesson to be taken from Greene’s experiments so far is that utilitarianism is a 
descriptive model of our moral judgments in certain contexts14. In the scenario where Joe 
is standing next to the backpack-wearing worker when he flicks the switch, killing the 
worker and saving five others, it was a highly approved-of action (Greene et al., 2009: 
366). Approval dropped only once Joe started to invest large amounts of effort to 
accomplish the same goal. Arguably, the respondents were not attempting to comply with 
an artificial, normative ethical theory. They were presented with a dilemma and responded 
accordingly. This demonstrates that utilitarianism is a natural method of approaching moral 
dilemmas, which is what a descriptive model of ethics needs to account for. 
By themselves, rationalist and emotivist moral theories have always suffered a blind 
spot in their descriptive powers. As we have seen, utilitarianism is not a normative theory 
                                                             
14 It is worth noting that this may not be true, as it is something of a matter of perspective. In non-moral 
dilemmas we are also utilitarians. If I am deliberating whether to go to gym tonight or to go and watch a 
movie, I am weighing up the costs and consequences of my choice in the same manner one approaches the 
footbridge dilemma. Nakamura (2013: 806-807) showed that by adjusting the numbers of workers in the 
footbridge dilemma, even by small amounts, one can easily convert people to and from utilitarianism. 
Changing the lone worker to a pair of workers halved the number of utilitarian responses, even if it meant 
saving five lives. It may be more accurate to think of utilitarianism as our “default” stance, a stance which is 
eventually overcome by moral emotions. 
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only, but rather describes how people spontaneously choose to resolve some moral 
dilemmas. And yet, when we engage in high levels of effort, an emotive approach 
becomes the more accurate model. It is only in combining both emotional and rational 
models that can we explain both types of behaviour, yet we are still stuck with the 
discrepancies in the variants of the footbridge dilemma. In order to explain our flip-flopping 
between utilitarian and emotive responses a final thread needs to be added to tie the two 
processes together, a thread that will explain why and how we choose between the two. 
 I believe this thread to be that of emotional responsibility. As our effort towards a 
goal increases, so too does the perceived joy of success or the pain of failure; as our effort 
invested in solving a moral dilemma increases, so too does our emotional investment in 
the dilemma. This thread explains Greene et al.’s findings regarding the application of 
force and the propensity to pursue deontological solutions to a dilemma. When we are 
emotionally charged through the investment of time, energy, and attention, we are less 
likely to act rationally. The net result of this is that normative moral theories – at least those 
that entail a purist approach to moral deliberation such a strict deontological or utilitarian 
approach – will have an additional burden: they will need to elucidate how to maintain the 
frame of mind required for the mode of moralizing. This is the inevitable outcome of the 
precept “ought implies can”; it makes no sense to say that I am morally obliged to pick up 
the boulder that is crushing a child unless I am in some way able to do so. Likewise, I can 
only obey a normative dictum to always make utilitarian judgments if I am able to divorce 
myself from any powerful moral-emotional forces that compel me to act otherwise. For 
example, if we took the standard trolley dilemma and exchanged the lone trapped worker 
and replaced it with a toddler, I expect that a steadfast utilitarian would be exceedingly 
hard to find. 
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The dual process model is an adaptable and accurate model of moral deliberation. 
When coupled with emotional responsibility it explains our inconsistencies when faced with 
near-identical moral dilemmas in ways purist theories simply cannot.  
One possible objection one might raise is that the DPM suffers from a lack of 
parsimony. It is indeed a more cumbersome model than those before it; the entirety of the 
SIM lives within a single node of the larger DPM, and who knows what maze of flowcharts 
might be found to be living in the others? Ockham’s razor looms large here. However, it 
can only be applied to unnecessary extravagance or desperate ad-hoc defences. Every 
node of the model is necessary to explain the apparent moral inconsistencies that people 
engage in when faced with moral dilemmas. To cut even one in the interests of parsimony 
will result in anomalies and the breakdown of the descriptive model. Perhaps this structural 
extravagance is to be expected; as I stated in the introduction, this thesis considers 
evolution to be the de facto case, and we will see in both the next section and Chapter 3 
evidence that morality is derived from evolutionary processes. Evolution is hardly a clean 
process. Vestigial organs and genetic throwbacks are often observed, leading to a degree 
of encumbrance one would not see in a perfectly engineered design. Perhaps one of the 
two processes is a fading biological relic, in the process of being replaced by a more 
efficient method of obtaining social cohesion. In any case, the argument from parsimony 
does not seem to mount much of a threat to my findings. 
2.3 Veneer vs. core theories 
So far we have seen how that which constitutes the moral domain incorporates both 
emotional responses and rational arbitration. Haidt and Prinz both declare their positions 
as naturalists and evolutionists, while Greene makes no mention of the issue. They also 
both state that they believed that evolutionary processes furnished human beings with the 
essential neurological and somatic hardware necessary for a person to engage in moral 
deliberation (Prinz, 2007: 71, 246; Haidt, 2001: 821, 826; 2004: 283). What is not clearly 
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stated by either Haidt or Prinz is to what degree this hardware is responsible in generating 
our moral understandings. This is the essential question which I wish to explore in this 
section. My position is that ethics and morality have taken their essential form from our 
biology, and other factors such as socialization, debate, and private reflection affect the 
finer details and precise articulations of our morality. To provide an illustrative analogy: 
biology is not the lump of clay from which the bowl of morality is formed, rather the bowl 
exists as a matter of biology, but its exact shape, size, and ornamentations are formed 
through socialization. 
 This conception of the moral hardware is not a new one. Charles Darwin alluded to 
a biologically-based source of morality, what he called the “moral sense” (2009: 50, 68, 71-
72). It is a position also championed by the neuro-ethicist Patricia Churchland (2011: 7-8, 
46), and by David Hume (2007: 161). 
Churchland argues that the mechanisms which drive our moral world are the same 
mechanisms which drive our own causal world only expanded to incorporate others (2011: 
7-8). In other words the same neurobiological hardware that causes me to avoid electrical 
shocks and acquire caramel sundaes is used in our moral deliberations. This is of course 
an oversimplification. Consider this specific example which Churchland uses: the insula is 
a small region of the brain tucked under the frontal lobe and is responsible for processing 
pain signals received from around the body (2011: 37). However when patients exhibit 
frontotemporal dementia, reducing the functionality of the insula, the patients not only 
demonstrate reduced sensitivity to pain, but also a loss of empathic responses (ibid.) The 
insula, a brain structure geared towards concern-for-me is also intimately involved in the 
concern-for-you. This multiplicity of functions for individual brain structures is what one 
might expect from an evolutionist’s paradigm, as Churchland points out: “Biological 
evolution does not achieve adaptations by designing a whole new mechanism from 
scratch, but modifies what is already in place... social emotions, values, and behaviour are 
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not the result of a wholly new engineering plan, but rather, an adaptation of existing 
arrangements that are intimately linked with the self-preserving circuitry” (2011: 46).  
Psychopaths are also a prime example of when neurological hardware failure leads 
to behavioural moral failure. Psychopaths do not experience remorse, guilt, or shame – 
which as discussed in section 2.2 are important moral emotions – and exhibit brain 
structures markedly different from control populations (Churchland, 2011: 40-41). 
Specifically the paralimbic regions of the brain, subcortical structures related to emotional 
and social responses, are both smaller and function at lower levels of activity to control 
groups. The high levels of heritability of psychopathic tendencies among twins and families 
(about 70%) also provides evidence that essential moral structures are carried in the DNA 
and are essentially biologically sourced (ibid.) The two biological systems which 
Churchland identifies as the most important are the oxytocin and arginine vasopressin 
(2011: 50-53, 63). These two hormones spike during both maternal care – nursing young 
for example – and during acts of altruism, conversely, when the neurotransmitters for 
these two hormones are blocked, the test subject shows a marked disinterest in the 
suffering of others (ibid.) 
Studies in infant and toddler behaviour supplement these statements, since new 
born children have not yet acquired significant socialization or conditioning. For example, 
infant humans will orientate themselves towards the distress of others, regularly adding 
their own cries (Preston & de Waal, 2002: 1). After the first year, children start to perform 
helping behaviour towards those who are distressed, even if they are themselves 
distressed (ibid; de Waal, 1996: 45). Further, Prinz cites several studies which show that 
two year old children are be able to differentiate between social rules and moral rules as 
the first is dependent on convention and the latter on harms inflicted on others (2007: 35-
36). This further reinforces the claim that moral understandings are grounded in instinct. 
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 Due to the central role which socialization plays in the formation of our moral beings 
for both Haidt and Prinz, it is reasonable to assume that they would disagree with my and 
Churchland’s position. Instead they would perhaps state that the biological hardware 
provides room in which a moral character may be created and nurtured, and is not 
automatically inherited15. Ayala (1987: 235) holds such a position, and so rather than 
wrestle with ghosts, I will direct the debate over this question towards his work.  
 Ayala’s thesis is that the moral domain is exclusive to human beings, based on the 
two arguments that the biological structures needed for morality to form were evolved 
through millions of years of evolution resulting in a neurological base , and through human 
socialization and enculturation. I aim to show that according to Ayala’s own requirements 
for ethical thinking, we will find ethical behaviours and thus presumably ethical thinking in 
animals. From that, I may further substantiate my earlier claim that biology forms the 
essential moral processes, demonstrating a reduced role of social factors in the formation 
of basic ethical convictions.  
 Ayala describes three necessary and sufficient conditions for ethical deliberation to 
take place (1987: 237-239). The most fundamental of which is to anticipate the 
consequences of one’s own actions. Ayala provides the example of a person pulling the 
trigger of a firearm: if that person has no knowledge of a gun is, or what pulling the trigger 
would result in, they cannot be held morally accountable for the aftermath. In the 
biological-sociological continuum, this requirement operates at both ends. To be able to 
anticipate the result of our actions requires a neurological structure capable of retaining 
                                                             
15 I have so far covered two of four possible positions: Ayala’s (and assumedly Haidt and Prinz’s) that biology 
forms the scaffold within which morality forms, and my position that biology provides the essential moral 
objects. The remaining two positions are that morality exists purely as a product of culture, completely free of 
biological constraints; and that morality is purely a product of biology, immune to social forces. However, the 
former cannot be held by a naturalist as all mental processes must be accounted for by the brain, and is 
ultimately bounded by biology. The latter position cannot account for moral plurality in genetically similar 
populations – a liberal child to conservative parents, for example – nor can it account for changes in moral 
beliefs such as a meat-eater being convinced to become vegan. 
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and utilizing the relevant information, as well as past exposure to the functioning of 
firearms.  
 My disagreement with Ayala's first condition arises where he states that this ability 
is exclusively found in the human domain, as anticipating future consequences is thinking 
in terms of means and ends. This condition, according to Ayala, was selected for through 
the advantages granted by tool working: “The ability to anticipate the future, essentially for 
ethical behaviour, is therefore closely associated with the development of the ability to 
construct tools” (1987: 238). However, tool use has been found in the animal kingdom, 
such as with chimpanzees (Tomasello et al., 1987: 175, 179-180). Furthermore, 
considering only immediate concrete tools as embodying means-and-ends thinking is far 
too limiting in terms of evolutionary pressures. For example, when hunting as a pack, 
wolves communicate with one another in order to maximize their chances of catching their 
prey (Feddersen-Petersen, 2000: 395). The wolves use each other as means to a 
common end. In essence, individuals within a society may willingly, or unwillingly, be used 
in the exact same manner as a concrete tool. Thus, means-to-end thinking is not 
necessarily the sole jurisdiction of human beings. There is no reason why any 
consciousness capable of communication with others is not also capable of means-to-an-
end thinking – or in other words, anticipating the results of its own actions. 
 The second necessary condition for ethical behaviour according to Ayala is the 
ability to make value judgments, to “perceive certain objects or deeds as more desirable 
than others” (1987: 238-239). And this, according to Ayala, is only possible through the 
ability for abstraction, of seeing actions or objects as members of general classes or 
categories. Again, Ayala states this ability exclusively belongs to the human domain. 
 Despite Ayala’s insistence that this ability and behaviour is not found in animals, 
there is an abundance of evidence in animal behavioural studies that show that at least 
certain species and groups of animals can engage in what appears to be conceptual 
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thinking, and perceive “certain objects or deeds as more desirable”. Chittka & Jensen 
(2011: R116) refer to studies that demonstrate pigeons can differentiate between 
photographs with people in them and unpopulated photographs. This suggests that a 
pigeon has the capacity to have an abstract category HUMAN, and recognize members of 
that class, regardless of the variability among individual members. Chimpanzees have also 
been shown able to sort a mix of tools and food into separate piles, even when individual 
items within each category had no obvious physical similarities to one another (ibid), again 
suggesting the ability to form abstract categories. Whether or not any animal is capable of 
abstract or categorical thinking is nonetheless treated as a contentious topic, the reasons 
for which de Waal might consider a form of prejudice and terms “anthropodenialism” 
(1997: 50). Anthropodenialism will form an important aspect to this thesis, and will be more 
thoroughly discussed in Chapter 3. 
 What is far less contentious is that animals are capable of valuing certain objects 
and deeds over others. The valuing of objects is most simply demonstrated by watching 
dogs at dinner time as they beg for food from the table even if there is food in their bowls. 
Further, Darwin's work on the role of sexual selection in the evolution of animals is based 
upon the idea that certain individuals can have desirable or valuable features such as 
plumage or food-gathering (1872: 46-47). While this doesn’t translate to moral or ethical 
capacities in itself, it does satisfy the second requirement Ayala demands for ethical 
behaviour. 
 The third and final requirement for ethical behaviour, according to Ayala, is free will 
(1987: 239). However, on my reading of Ayala’s argument I found there is a degree of 
conceptual confusion between free will and freedom in his work. Ayala states that “pulling 
the trigger can be a moral action only if I have the option not to pull it” (ibid.) The 
availability of options is a question of freedom – a person chained to a wall has no freedom 
but may still have the metaphysical spark of free will that allows that person to transcend 
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from the web of causality that a determinist would insist we are entrapped. My 
interpretation is supported by Ayala’s statement that “free will is dependent on the 
existence of a well developed intelligence” as this enables us to “explore alternative 
courses of action” (ibid), i.e. intelligence expands our list of options and thus freedom, but 
does not necessarily grant free will.  
 For this third point Ayala does not insist that the capacity for free will is the 
exclusive domain of the human intellect, but it does offer a delineating factor: certain forms 
of life, and certain forms of intelligence do not have the capacity to explore alternative 
courses of action, and thus lack the freedom of mind required for ethical behaviour. Plants 
do not choose to grow in such shapes, but are bent and drawn towards the light as a result 
of biochemical interactions and there are no other options on the table. Unicellular life such 
as amoeba respond to surrounding stimuli in the same manner, with pseudopodia 
reaching towards food, cell membranes hardening in arid conditions and so forth (Van 
Haastert, 2011: 1-2). 
 The point of this, then, is that even assuming that Ayala is correct in his 
requirements for ethical behaviour, there is no reason why these requirements are fulfilled 
exclusively by human intelligence alone. Despite this, in English for example, we can see 
how the idea of morality and humanness go hand in hand, as we describe the “inhumane” 
acts of a murderer or the “inhumanity” of the Nazis. This, I think, reflects our attempts at a 
linguistic level to divorce those people from the moral community. A similar pattern can be 
found in Japanese where “ningen” (人間) means “human”, and by adding the prefix “hi” 
(denoting a negative) and the suffix “teki” (denoting adjective) results in “hi-ningen-teki” (非
人間的) or “inhumane” (or directly translated, not-human-ness). The same pattern can be 
found in the Japanese word “jindou” (人道) or “the-way-of-human”. By adding the same 
prefix and suffix we have “hi-jindou-teki” (非人道的) which means “brutal” (or not-the-way-
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of-human).16 In Hlubi the phrase “awu ngomntu” is used to describe someone who shows 
a lack of sympathy, and means that that person is not human (literally: awu = not, ngomntu 
= person).17 In African philosophy, the naming of the ethical system “Ubuntu” is an Nguni 
Bantu term meaning literally “humanness”. 
One of the keystones to this thesis is not that we ought to “extend” the concept of 
morality to non-human animals, promoting savage animals to “civilized” status. Rather it is 
to recognize that non-human animals have moral capacities in their own right, independent 
of our own moral capacities. To achieve a proper realization of this, we need to be aware 
of the tacit assumptions we make of both morality and humanness, even in our everyday 
speech. This tacit assumption of morality being uniquely human will be more closely 
examined in Chapter 3 as well. 
In this section I argued for an understanding of moral capacities that is heavily 
dependent on the biology of the individual. However, one should not get the impression 
that this is identical to a “genes-only” understanding of morality; that there is gene for 
honesty, a gene for violence. As I stated earlier, there is a complex interplay between the 
biological structures and the sociological factors. This section will briefly examine this 
interplay in more detail. 
There are five fundamental dynamics that inform our moral-intuitive responses, and 
these dynamics are common to all humans, as is shown by other studies (Brown, 1991; de 
Waal, 1996; Fiske, 1992; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990; Shweder, et al.: 
1997). The first dynamic is that of the avoidance of harm, and the promotion of care: the 
“harm/care dynamic”. The second dynamic is promotion of fairly sharing resources and 
reciprocal treatment: the “fairness/reciprocity dynamic”. Haidt labels these two dynamics 
as “liberal" dynamics. The third dynamic involves the obedience to authority, and the 
                                                             
16 Dr. Masako Osada of the Centre for Japanese Studies, personal communication. 
17 Sifanele Xwazi, personal communication. 
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respect of social hierarchies: the “authority/respect dynamic”. The fourth dynamic is 
concerned with group identity and loyalty: “in-group/out-group loyalty dynamic”. The fifth 
and final dynamic is that of spiritual purity and the sanctity of certain spaces and 
institutions: the “purity/sanctity dynamic”. These last three are identified as “conservative” 
dynamics (Haidt, 2001: 826; Haidt, 2004: 288-289; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008: 202-203). 
A strict “genes-only” reading of the above dynamics might imply that we should see 
a great degree of moral homogeneity within population groups but not necessarily between 
cultural groups. This is to say that if these dynamics arose from and are exclusively 
sensitive to our genetic data, then children would have near-identical moral values to their 
parents, regardless of upbringing. The most powerful counterexample to this would be the 
hippy movement of the 1960s, where long standing social traditions were overturned in a 
single generation. The cultural schism of the sixties was a moral schism where 
conservative dynamics gave way to liberal dynamics. Thus the variety of moral codes 
found among cultures seem to arise through learning, socialization with peers and adults, 
and the media.  
A gene-first reading simply does not hold up under scrutiny. This is not to say that 
genes play no role in forming our moral selves, but rather, as De Waal (2006: 38-39) 
argues, our genes are the clay of our morals, and the specific expressions formed 
depends on the influences of our environment and society. Haidt speculates that these 
influences may increase or diminish sensitivity in some of these five dynamics, in a similar 
fashion in which babies lose sensitivity to phonemes that are not used in their home 
language (Haidt, 2001: 826-828; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008: 210-211). If this analogy is 
sufficiently accurate, then we ought to see a direct correlation between levels of exposure 
to cosmopolitan lifestyles with a belief that morality is relative. In any case, the formulation 
of a coherent moral system, like a coherent language, requires a large amount of input 
from social sources. 
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The most important of these sources, according to Churchland, appears to be the 
early maternal bond (2011: 52-53). As mentioned above, arginine vasopressin and 
oxytocin are two hormones which are intimately tied with both moral behaviour and 
maternal actions. Experiments on voles showed that pups that were hand-raised or were 
from otherwise neglectful mothers showed a marked decrease in basal levels of oxytocin 
and arginine vasopressin, and behaved in a manner that was disinterested and uncaring 
towards other voles in the experimental colony compared to the control group (ibid.) 
In summary, moral behaviour is totally dependent on biological systems for their 
existence, but are not necessarily totally dependent on them for their exact nature and 
expression. Sociological factors, primarily that of the early child/guardian relationship, can 
still have powerful effects on one’s moral values and intuitions.  
2.4 Conclusion 
We are now armed with a thorough understanding of what constitutes the moral domain: it 
is emotional, and yet also rational. It is a product of biology, and yet also is subject to 
culture and learning. It encompasses concerns including the care of others, identity and 
loyalty to the group, and the evanescent “purity” of the self. 
 The understanding of the moral domain as being so broad in scope is supported by 
numerous fMRI investigations into brain activity during moral deliberation (Feldmanhall et 
al., 2013: 1), especially compared to non-moral dilemmas (ibid: 5). Yet there exists a 
single thread that weaves through this entire definition. It is that moral concerns are 
inextricably concerns for others. Moral thinking is social thinking, or perhaps more 
accurately stated as a special breed of social thinking. It is social thinking that is framed by 
issues of harm and care to other individuals, as well as social cohesion within the group. 
 Contra Gert, who I referred to for a definition of morality in the introduction to this 
chapter, morality is not about the conduct of the individual. It is the conduct of the 
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individual within a social milieu. A statement echoed by Churchland and De Waal (2011: 8, 
12; 2006: 161, 163; 1996: 30). 
 The details of what morality is – a fusion of emotion and rationality, inborn but 
shaped by the  environment– are all important details that will come in handy when 
constructing the moral community and defining who might belong in Chapter 4.  
 In the next chapter we now expand the discussion to include other species. We will 
deal with the problem of anthropomorphism in animal studies – of attributing human-like 
qualities where they don’t belong. We will discuss various forms of altruism as it is found in 
several species. We will also discuss the issues of inferring the existence of moral minds 
from apparent moral behaviour. These discussions will be crucial if the moral community is 
to have any hope of including minds that are not human.  
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3. Morality beyond Humanity 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2 we saw how moral thinking is social thinking; it is ultimately the concern for 
others as individuals and as a cohesive group. We also saw research discussed by 
Churchland and Greene et al. which suggested an overlap in the biological bases for moral 
capacity among species, mammals in particular (Churchland, 2011: 63). The question of 
this chapter is as to whether or not this understanding of morality can be found in 
intelligences other than human beings. The answer to this question will have important 
implications on the shape of the moral community. Additionally, the answer serves as a 
reply to accusations that any discussions of moral communities will place human morality 
at the top of the communal hierarchy. While it is true that in order to recognize morality in 
others there must be some conceptual overlap – that is, some features of “human morality” 
must exist in “wombat morality” for either species to recognize the other’s morality – and 
thus it is from the overlaps of moral capacities that the moral community is created, but 
this does not necessitate a hierarchy of moralities. 
 In recent years it has been increasingly accepted that animals, especially the 
higher-order primates, are capable of altruism, moral emotions, and genuine concern for 
others. This has not always been the case; “anthropodenialism” had previously been the 
reigning paradigm in the scientific community (de Waal, 1997: 50). I will discuss this issue 
first as it is the most immediate challenge to recognizing morality beyond humanity. Next, I 
will look at the issue of altruism in the animal kingdom, at its causes – proximal and 
ultimate – and argue that not all altruism is equal and that this needs to be taken into 
account when forming our ideas of morality beyond humanity. Finally I will consider some 
objections that may be made against using behavioural studies to infer the presence of 
morality. 
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3.2 Anthropomorphism and anthropodenialism 
If we are to ever apply the findings of this thesis to society, we must perform a task which 
appears simple at first, yet has been shown to be fraught with difficulties in both popular 
and academic spheres. We need to be able to recognize human-like qualities18 in non-
humans, while restraining ourselves from projecting human-like qualities where there are 
none. The latter is a case of anthropomorphism – specifically what I will later define as 
“emotional anthropomorphism”, while to deny the possibility of the former would be called 
anthropodenialism. I will deal with these two issues before moving on to case studies of 
morality beyond humanity.  
The primatologist Frans de Waal recounts the reprimands he received from his 
supervisors when he was studying chimpanzee behaviour: 
More than once I was asked whether the term "reconciliation" was not overly 
anthropomorphic. Whereas terms related to aggression, violence, and competition 
never posed the slightest problem, I was supposed to switch to dehumanized 
language as soon as the affectionate aftermath of a fight was the issue. A 
reconciliation sealed with a kiss became a “postconflict interaction involving mouth-
to-mouth contact.” 
 (1996: 18-19) 
This is the crux of the anthropodenialism. It is the belief that non-humans cannot have 
traits that are commonly believed to be uniquely human, specifically goods traits as in the 
above extract. In Chapter 2 I discussed how the ideas of morality and humanness are 
linguistically and conceptually linked. What de Waal recounts can be seen as another 
manifestation of that link. 
 Anthropodenialism is used in defence against charges of anthropomorphism. 
Anthropomorphism is the projection of what is generally regarded to be human features 
                                                             
18 Or at least, qualities nominally claimed to be unique to human beings, especially positive qualities. See the 
discussion in section 2.3 regarding a linguistic and conceptual overlap between “moral” and “humanness”. 
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onto non-human subjects, such as in the example of the PETA advertisement discussed in 
the introduction to this thesis, or even onto inanimate objects.  There are certainly cases of 
this, and sometimes, anthropomorphism can derail or impede intended efforts or even lead 
to false claims. 
 Let us take a look at the case of the rhino maggot. In 1995 an endangered white 
rhino was brought to the United Kingdom from South Africa, and it was soon found to host 
a juvenile rhino maggot, an endangered parasite which lives exclusively on the equally 
endangered white rhino (Kaplan, 2004: 40). The maggot was removed and left to starve to 
death, leading the entomologist Martin Hall to dryly remark: “‘Save the rhino maggot’ 
doesn’t have much appeal as a conservation slogan” (ibid.) It seems that conservation 
efforts are motivated so much through anthropomorphism that we cannot recognize 
legitimate conservation efforts without the emotional effect provided by anthropomorphism. 
 One can of course counter that animal rights organisations do not, in principle, 
favour anthropomorphised and neotenized species. 19 Rather, the prevalence of rabbits, 
puppies and the like on their various media platforms is merely a political decision, not a 
philosophical one, a “tug at the heart strings” to engender broader support. There are two 
replies to this claim. First, it does not explain the apathy towards the death of a being 
which, in terms of conservation of biodiversity, is of equal value to the white rhino. Had the 
rhino been left to starve to death instead of the maggot, the outcry from all corners would 
have been enormous. Second, wellsprings of political influence are often derived from 
philosophical beliefs, whether implicit or explicit, examined or unexamined.  
 I argue that anthropomorphism and, as a related issue, neoteny, can be grounded 
in speciesist assumptions. It is to not merely identify human features in non-human 
                                                             
19 Neonteny is the retention of juvenile features, in laymen terms it is “cuteness” (Jones et al., 1995: 728, 
736-737). There is substantial literature showing that neoteny is sexually selected trait not only in humans, 
but other animal species as well cf. (Crow, 1993; Grammer et al., 2003; Jones et al., 1995). It follows that, if 
neoteny is related to success as it is selected for in acts of procreation, then it ought to be limited to within 
the same species. However, if it is extended to species beyond one’s own, then anthropomorphism of the 
other species is implied. 
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subjects, but also by virtue of this identification to hold those subjects in higher regard than 
those subjects who do not appear to have human features.  
 It is important to note that there is a distinct difference between recognizing similar 
traits in others, and projecting those traits where there are none. Recall the quotation from 
de Waal above; the kissing chimps were not kissing, their conciliatory, intimate behaviour 
had to be mechanized, “dehumanized” for lack of a better word. In this case, the fear of 
misapplying anthropic traits outweighs the use of accurate descriptors. 
 So caught between these two positions, describing creatures with empathetic words 
or being clinically detached, how ought we to proceed? I support de Waal’s 
recommendation: that anthropomorphism be used as an explanatory tool (2006: 65). This 
is to say that anthropomorphism should be applied when it increases the predictability of 
observed behaviour. This is in contrast to the form of anthropomorphism which the 
anthropologist Marshall Thomas uses, cited by De Waal (64), where “wolves set out for the 
hunt without pitying themselves” and “virgin bitches save their virginity for their husbands”. 
These statements add an emotional dimension which does not provide us with explanatory 
powers over the animal’s behaviours. Further, it may skew our understanding of the 
subject’s psychology by projecting our own constructs onto their minds. 
The use of anthropomorphism as an explanatory tool also plays into the principle of 
evolutionary parsimony, where two species act the same, the underlying mental processes 
are probably the same too – this is especially true where the species are related (62). We 
must keep in mind, as discussed in Chapter 2, that evolution is a tinkerer, not a designer; 
more complex cognitive systems came about through the expansion of simpler cognitive 
systems which were successful in previous generations. There is no reason why this 
principle should not hold true for moral systems too. If we accept Darwin’s argument 
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(2009: 50, 68, 71-72)20 that morality is an evolved trait in humans, there is no reason we 
cannot find it in other species, either in a “simpler” state, or as a product of convergent 
evolution.  
 By now we can identify a distinction between what might be called “emotional 
anthropomorphism” and “rational anthropomorphism”. Emotional anthropomorphism is 
extremely useful as it is one of the underpinnings of empathy. It is to see yourself in 
another, not in a cold, analytical manner but as an immediate emotional connection that 
helps establish a sense of shared identity, of community. De Waal uses the term “uncritical 
anthropomorphism” (2006: 62), however in addition to the negative connotation which the 
term “uncritical” carries, it also seems to gloss over a fundamental component to this breed 
of anthropomorphism, specifically the emotional character of the act. 
 Rational anthropomorphism by contrast, is the kind which is only called upon when 
it adds to our explanatory powers. In the following section, in which we look at the 
apparent altruistic and moral lives of various animals, we will see what it takes to be “truly” 
altruistic over “functionally” altruistic, what the different causes of altruism are from an 
evolutionary paradigm, and which of these types of altruism we might value. As we have 
seen earlier with statements from de Waal, observations of apparent altruistic actions in 
animals are often explained through much more complex terminology than that of 
admitting moral capacities in the animal. This is done to avoid supposed unprofessional or 
unscientific appeals to emotional anthropomorphism. However, if we accept rational 
anthropomorphism as I have discussed in this section, we will see that there are animals 
who live rich social and moral lives, lives which are traditionally conceived of as being 
exclusively human. 
                                                             
20 Contemporary studies in evolution corroborate Darwin’s position as well. See Churchland (2011), and de 
Waal (2006). 
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3.3 The computing ape and the kamikaze honeybee 
Scores of bees defend their nest against an interloper, sacrificing their lives for the good of 
the hive. A flock of flamingos take off as one because one of their members signals an 
approaching threat, endangering itself in the process. An ape carries a bucket of drinking 
water over to an unrelated, sickly ape without training or apparent reward. These are three 
cases of altruism, the act of assisting another at the expense of the self. In this section, I 
will examine these cases and argue that, while broadly they all belong to the category of 
“altruism”, not all acts of altruism are equal, and only the third case of the helpful ape is of 
the kind that can be said to be moral in nature. 
 From an evolutionary perspective, altruism can be puzzling. It is defined as 
occurring when “an organism reduces the number of offspring it is likely to produce itself, 
but boosts the number that other organisms are likely to produce” (Okasha, 2013). 21 
Given the process of natural selection, we would expect an eventual extinction of the 
altruistic traits in a given population in favour of more selfish traits. 
 One explanation for the favouring of altruistic traits is that of “kin selection”, where 
an individual will promote the fitness of its relatives (Wade, 1980: 665). The starkest 
example is drawn from the honeybee (Apis mellifera), where sterile worker bees work to 
serve the hive, and die to defend it while in a condition of “eusociality”: the highest order of 
social cohesion (Wilson & Holldobler, 2005: 13367). In fact, their cohesion among 
individuals of beehives and ant nests is so high that Richard Dawkins has suggested that it 
may be easier to conceive of the hives and nests as macro-organisms themselves, and 
the bees or ants as organs of those organisms (2006: 171-172). Kin selection theory posits 
that in serving the hive, the worker bees effectively serve themselves. By assisting the 
queen bee, with whom they share half of their genes, they ensure the continuation of their 
own genes for another generation. This theory produces a testable prediction: a hive which 
                                                             
21 “Fitness” or “reproductive fitness” is the term used to describe a subject’s probability of producing offspring 
(Okasha, 2013).  
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loses its queen will show a reduction in altruistic behaviour. This is the prediction which 
Naeger et al. set out to test. 
 When a hive becomes queenless, it is possible for some worker bees to develop 
ovaries and begin laying haploid eggs (Naeger et al., 2013: 1574). 22 This means that even 
in a queenless colony, it is possible for the hive to perpetuate some of its genetic material 
with ovary-bearing workers functioning as ersatz queens. A queen and its worker have a 
genetic commonality of 75%, while the genetic commonality between the haploid eggs and 
workers is half that (Queller & Strassmann, 1998: 167). As predicted by kin-selection 
theory, Naeger et al. found that worker investment in colony maintenance was reduced 
once the colony entered a queenless state and reproduction was left to haploid-laying 
workers (2013: 1576).23 
 The question here is: Can we call this kin-altruism true altruism? The answer to that 
question is dependent on another: What exactly constitutes the self? The everyday 
understanding of the term relies on an individual-oriented conception of the self. The 
individual bee reduces its chances of survival to assist another individual bee in surviving 
and reproducing. An evolutionary concept of the self are gene-oriented so, biologically, a 
set of genes is acting in such a way that the majority of itself will survive to the next 
generation. In queenless colonies, less of the gene-self will be replicated in the next 
generation and so altruistic interests are likewise reduced. As an explanatory model, the 
biological paradigm is able to account for the behaviour of the bees in queenless colonies 
to a greater degree than other accounts which rely on rationality or other motivations. 
 If one accepts the biological paradigm, the I-am-my-genes paradigm, then we can 
say that kin-altruism is not true-altruism as it is ultimately a self-serving act to assist in the 
                                                             
22 “Haploid” means to only contain one set of chromosomes as opposed to the usual two sets in diploid eggs 
(Naeger et al., 2013: 1574). The haploid eggs of bees are the eggs of male drones (ibid.) 
23 There have been other studies which have shown that interactions between bees are dictated by their 
genetic similarity, such as Greenberg’s 1979 study (cited in Rushton et al., 1984: 183) which demonstrated a 
very strong correlation (r = 0.93) between a bee’s genetic similarity to a queen and its likelihood of being 
allowed entry to the hive by the guard bees. 
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continuation of your own genes. It is, of course, absurd to say that every bee in a 
queenless colony has consciously calculated that there has been a 50% reduction in 
genetic similarity with the haploid eggs, and thus a corresponding drop in altruistic actions 
is in order. Just as it is also absurd to say that a human parent only cares for their baby 
due to some calculation of genetic overlap, and they selfishly want their genetic data – 
which they may not even be aware of if they lacked formal education – to be continued for 
another generation. Herein lies the distinction between ultimate and proximate causes. 
 In evolutionary and sociobiological discourse, an ultimate cause is described as the 
agent of natural selection which explains the given behaviour. A proximate cause is the 
immediate physiological or environmental factor which would explain the behaviour 
(Francis, 1990: 401). For example, the ultimate cause of a parent caring for their child 
would be the preservation of genes, while the proximate cause is described in terms of the 
strong emotional bond a parent has with the child – explained biochemically through 
heightened levels of oxytocin and arginine vasopressin (Churchland, 2011: 50-53).  
 One might protest at this point and say then that this implies that there are no truly 
altruistic acts. If morality is the result of evolutionary pressures, and natural selection 
operates through whatever might improve gene survival, then all supposedly “moral” acts 
are self-serving acts. This argument engages in the reductionism which the cognitive 
neuroscientist Steven Pinker cautions against: 
When a person's public stance is selfless but his private motives serve his interests, 
we can call it hypocrisy. However, when a person's public stance and private 
motives are both selfless but those motives came about because they once served 
the interests of his ancestors' genes, we have not uncovered hypocrisy; we have 
invoked a scientific explanation couched at a different level of analysis…the 
evolutionary causes of our motives can't be judged as if they are our motives. 
(cited in de Waal, 1996: 238) 
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 Does this counter my earlier claim that kin-altruism is not true altruism? It does 
temper the strength of the claim, but we cannot ignore the fact that most parents care 
exponentially more for their own children than they do about a stranger half a world away. 
It is also highly unintuitive to say that to serve your children dinner is equally morally 
laudable as to feed the homeless. One may of course point out that we are duty-bound to 
care for our children, while we are not duty-bound to care for the homeless. But this only 
answers half the dilemma: failure to perform a duty ought to at least bring about a sense of 
disapprobation, but then why does fulfilling an oft ignored non-duty bring about a sense of 
approbation?  
 I believe the answer to be that morality is the overgeneralization of kin-care. This is 
not a recent idea, and can be traced back Lecky’s 1869 text History of European Morals 
where he describes what came to be known as “the expanding circle of morality” (Singer, 
2006: 226; de Waal, 1996: 213). This circle entails the beginning of care with the self, and 
as available resources increase the scope of our care grows to incorporate family, then 
friends, class, and so forth (ibid.) Churchland also cites compelling studies in 
neuroendocrinology which suggest that, in mammals at least, oxytocin “has been recruited 
in organizing the brain to extend self-care to infants, and thence to a wider circle of caring 
relationships” (2011: 63). 
While extremely rare, there are also some reports of altruistic acts between 
members of different species, such as the hippopotamus which saved a drowning zebra 
and wildebeest in Tanzania (van Rooyen, 2010). These reports are especially confounding 
for the earlier reductionist argument. If all behaviours are necessarily and perfectly aligned 
with gene-propagation, then altruism has no business with cross-species non-reciprocal 
aid (Darwin, 2009: 108; Wyatt et al., 2013: 1854, 1861). Care for others is essential for 
child rearing, and very useful in reciprocal alliances, but it is only the overspill of that care 
which is true altruism. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
43 
 
So what about the bees? Naeger et al.’s study showed how intimately tied the 
behaviours of the bees are to the first level of care for others. The moment there was a 
loss in genetic similarity of progeny, there was a corresponding loss of altruistic behaviour 
in the hive. Bees, and a number of similarly organized animals, cannot be said to be truly 
altruistic, to hold a true moral capacity. 
It should be clear by now that for the purposes of the normative claim of this thesis 
the biological definition of altruism is insufficient. There is another term from biology which 
might serve: “succorance” or “succorant behaviour” which is defined as helping, 
caregiving, or providing relief to distressed or endangered individuals other than progeny 
(de Waal, 1996: 40-41). This term is more in line with the above statement that true 
altruism is the overspill of care. But is succorance alone a necessary and sufficient reason 
to welcome an individual or species into a pragmatic moral community? To answer this 
question, let us now consider the case of the crying flamingo. 
In the introduction to this thesis I argued that a defining characteristic of a 
community is the interactions which occur among the concerned individuals. This implies 
that membership to a community is dependent on two criteria: the capacity to treat another 
in a manner which defines the community as such, in this case a moral community 
requires moral consideration, and also the capacity to incorporate the rest of the moral 
community within the scope of this treatment. Bees failed at the first criterion, their 
altruistic behaviour being driven by kin-care. But what of the flamingo, feeding at a lake’s 
edge with its flock, who upon seeing a leopard stalking through the cattails, gives out a 
warning cry that launches the flock into flight? The cry would single itself out to the 
predator, but serves to protect the rest of the flock. Does this altruism achieve the two 
criteria needed to be a member of the moral community? 
One might say that the flamingo is acting no different to the bees. The individual 
endangers itself to protect its family, and as argued earlier from an I-am-my-genes 
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perspective, this is not true altruism. This argument is dependent on the common idea that 
a flock of birds is analogous to a hive or family. However, a series of genetic studies have 
shown that while genetic similarity among birds can be roughly drawn along geographic 
lines (Foerster et al., 2006: 4555), flocks themselves do not follow family structures 
(Westneat & Webster, 1994: 92). Adults and emancipated juveniles intermingle among 
flocks without any apparent familial organisation. 
The flamingo then exhibits succorant behaviour. This fulfils the first criterion listed 
above, but does it fulfil the second? The flamingo has the capacity to engage in actions to 
help others in distress. Frans de Waal asked a similar question (2006: 25). He argued that 
the bird was acting reflexively, a reflex that had come about by powerful evolutionary 
pressures for protecting its immediate community alone. While de Waal’s stance is that we 
should not consider this reflexive behaviour as altruistic, I would argue that it is indeed 
altruism—a relatively simplistic form of altruism that may have formed the primitive basis of 
more evolved forms of morality, but altruism nonetheless. That it is a reflexive act is, 
however, still an issue when attempting to bring this sort of individual into the moral 
community. The fact that it is a reflexive act, evolutionarily selected for use only on a small, 
exclusive group means that the second criterion cannot be fulfilled. In other words the 
flamingo may hold others in a moral regard, but these others are restricted to such an 
extremely limited group of individuals that the flamingo cannot pragmatically belong to the 
entire moral community.24 
What is necessary to belong to a moral community then, is the ability to “get under 
the skin” of others, to see from their perspective, understand their needs, and enact a plan 
to assist them. This is not merely an empathetic emotional projection as I discussed earlier 
with emotional anthropomorphism. It is also a rational act of identifying concerns and 
developing strategies which are adaptable to varying contexts, and are not merely 
                                                             
24 The issue of moral agents not extending moral considerations to deserving others will be discussed in 
Chapter 4.4. 
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reflexive cues. The emotional aspect is implied by succorance itself. The flamingo flew off 
out of fear, and gave its cry out of fear for its flock-mates. The two rational components 
required to “get under the skin” are those of perspective taking, and targeted helping. 
Perspective taking is a rational estimation of what another being is capable of 
perceiving (Kaminski et al., 2008: 980). For example, Kaminski et al. found that when 
trained dogs are given a “fetch” command, and two balls are in the dog’s field of view, but 
only one is in the field of view of the owner, the dog will always fetch the ball which the 
person can see (985). 
How does this relate to moral communities? When acting within the context of a 
community, members must take the perspective of many disparate others into account 
while engaging with them. The crying flamingo, by contrast, will only give a warning cry 
when there is a threat to their immediate surroundings. Had the leopard been spotted 
stalking another flock of birds on the far side of the lake, the flamingo would not have given 
a warning cry. The perspective of the flamingo is limited to itself. If we forgo the 
requirement of perspective taking, and incorporate the two flocks on the lake in a single 
community, it could not be recognized as such, since their perspectives are limited to 
themselves, they could not mutually assist each other. 
Frans de Waal defines targeted helping as “altruistic behaviour tailored to the 
specific needs of the others, even in novel situations” (2006: 31-32). Perspective taking is 
a prerequisite to targeted helping, since you need to identify those specific needs which 
may differ from your own. Targeted helping is thus the behavioural expression of a 
combination of altruism and perspective taking, and is a crucial component needed to 
contribute to a moral community and thus to belong to one. 
De Waal provides an illustrative example of targeted helping at work in the animal 
kingdom which he observed while researching chimpanzees at a zoo (Ibid): Old tyres are 
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given to the animals to play with in their pens. The pens are also hosed down from time to 
time to keep them clean. One afternoon after a cleaning, De Waal noticed a young 
chimpanzee who was attempting to pull a tyre over to the niche where she usually played. 
However, the tyre had caught a lot of water during the cleaning process which made the 
tyre unusually heavy. After a few minutes of struggling, the chimp gave up and went over 
to her niche. A larger adult chimpanzee had been watching this, and once the juvenile had 
quit, lumbered over to the tyre, and dragged it to the youth, and left her to play with the 
tyre. The adult had received no training to this effect, and did not appear to receive any 
reward.25 
Why did the adult chimpanzee act in such a manner? De Waal is satisfied that this 
was an example of targeted helping. The chimpanzee observed the juvenile’s struggle, 
understood her intentions and goals, and assisted her in achieving these things. We might 
say that this particular example is not, strictly speaking, a moral action, but that is beside 
the point. The claim here is not that targeted helping is a moral property in itself, but is a 
property necessary to belong to a larger community of moral agents. 
Another response, and one which is fairly common in explaining apparent altruism 
in animals, is that selfless actions such as these are part of a larger strategic plan (de 
Waal, 1996: 151; de Waal 2006: 33). We might argue that the adult chimpanzee was 
making early moves in a long term strategic plan to win over the juvenile for later support 
as the group alpha. Again, this response does not take into account that targeted helping 
is not a moral property in itself. It may explain the ultimate cause of targeted helping, but 
that does not diminish its pragmatic value in the moral community. Secondly, when used to 
explain purportedly altruistic acts in animals, this strategic explanation endows the animal 
with an incredible mental repertoire of memory, long-term planning, and manipulative 
guile. It turns a relatively simple act of aiding a conspecific in achieving a task for no real 
                                                             
25 There are numerous other examples of targeted helping, mostly in chimpanzees. Cf. (Pruetz, 2011; Melis 
et al., 2011; Yamamoto et al., 2012) 
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benefit, to massively complex political manoeuvring. The net effect being that we can 
explain a behaviour without resorting to moral concepts in animals. We create a computing 
ape to avoid discussing a moral ape. While we cannot say for certain that the adult 
chimpanzee is not a sly politician, it is the simpler and more likely explanation to say the 
adult was helping the child. 
It should be noted with de Waal’s anecdote that the adult chimpanzee’s ability to 
move the tyre alone does not constitute targeted helping. Had it been another juvenile that 
tried and failed to move the tyre, we can still surmise that it was in an effort assist the first 
juvenile. We can say then that the assisting juvenile understood the goals and desires of 
the first, and at least attempted to fulfil them. We should also note that the conceptual 
difference between perspective taking and targeted helping is twofold. Firstly, perspective 
taking is purely a mental exercise which is occasionally evident in behaviours as we saw 
with the dogs fetching the balls, while targeted helping incorporates the physical act of 
helping another once we have understood what their needs or goals are. Furthermore, 
perspective taking does not imply concern or altruism, it is merely the estimation of 
another’s point-of-view. Targeted helping does at least suggest altruism, unless one 
accepts the argument of the computing ape. 
In summary, I have covered three primary points in this section. First, there is an 
important distinction between kin-altruism and true-altruism. Kin-altruism is ultimately self-
serving as we see in the kamikaze honeybee and cannot be extended beyond family 
members. True-altruism is the overgeneralization of kin-care to non-kin. I would also like to 
point out that in this discussion I have focused on the term “altruism” as opposed to 
“morality”. The reason being that altruism is a publicly observable behaviour and subject to 
much research, while morality also includes private emotional states, deliberations, and 
the avoidance of “bad” behaviours. Given further research or the capacity to see into the 
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minds of the studied subjects, observations of morality would be a preferred topic of 
discussion.  
Second, I have argued that the capacity for altruism is in itself insufficient to belong 
to the moral community. One needs to be able to take the perspective of others by 
estimating their point-of-view in order to understand their needs.  
Thirdly, I argued that targeted helping is a functional expression of perspective 
taking which strongly implies altruistic concerns. 
One may reject these three points, arguing that it is all inferred from behaviours. We 
do not know for certain if the bees care for the welfare of other hives as much as their own. 
We do not know if the crying flamingo would help another flock if it could. We do not know 
if the ape is really helping, or playing a political game. The animals in question cannot tell 
us their intentions and motivations, so can we make any estimation of them based on 
behaviour? This question will be addressed in the next section. 
3.4 Behaviourism, Batman, and Solipsism 
In the above discussion of morality in animals, we have been largely limited to behavioural 
studies. The obvious language barrier between species forces us to look at the actions of 
animals rather than their stated intentions, since they have no way of telling us what they 
might be! 
 Studying an animal through its behaviours alone comes with a major drawback, 
namely that we can only clearly judge its actions through the consequences of its 
behaviour. For example, if I come upon a nomadic family where the mother is trying to 
reach up into a tree to grab some low hanging fruit, but is too short to do so, she can still 
tell me that she wants the fruit to feed her child. On the other hand, if I came upon a troupe 
of chimps in a similar situation, I have no idea if the chimpanzee reaching for the fruit 
wants it for its own dinner, or feed another chimp, or whether it simply wants to play with a 
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colourful, ball-shaped object. It is only once the chimp has succeeded in its attempts to 
seize the fruit that I can come to a reasonable conclusion on the nature of the chimp’s 
actions, and hence whether they can be said to be a moral act or not. 
 Consequentialists such as utilitarians26 may scoff and ask why that is an issue, 
since it is only the net result that matters and not the intent. However, to read morality into 
actions and their consequences alone is not completely satisfactory, as can be illustrated 
in the following “Batman” thought experiment:  
1) As a vigilante, Batman has saved B people in Gotham. 
2) Batman became a vigilante because of the murder of his parents. 
3) Thus, the murderer of Batman’s parents (Mr Frost) saved B – 2 people in Gotham. 
By a purely consequentialist reasoning then, Mr Frost is always almost as much of a hero 
as Batman. To argue “but he killed two people!” or that “Frost could not foresee such an 
outcome!” is to abandon the consequentialist paradigm, as so long as Batman saves more 
than two people, the net consequence of Mr Frost’s actions is a positive. 
 A steadfast consequentialist may accept this argument, and state that Mr Frost is, 
indeed, almost as much a hero as Batman. But here we come upon a paradox: Mr Frost is 
in a moral superposition of villain, civilian, and hero. His quantum moral character only 
collapses into a definite state once we solve for B. Immediately after the murders, Mr Frost 
is a villain. However, sometime later he becomes morally neutral as, through no further 
actions or decisions on Mr Frost’s part, Bruce Wayne returns to Gotham as Batman and 
saves two lives. Again, a short time later Mr Frost’s moral state increases to hero as 
Batman saves more lives. To accept a consequentialist line of reasoning then, is to also 
accept that the moral status of a person may vary radically as time passes even if that 
                                                             
26 We may wish to also recall in Chapter 2, where I argued that pure utilitarianism may not even be feasible. 
Consider the standard trolley problem I mentioned where the choice is between five strangers, and your own 
child. It may be more useful to think of utilitarianism as the default position we take, even in non-moral 
issues, and it carries a certain “inertia” that must be overcome by moral emotions. 
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person performs absolutely no further actions. While we may be able to say “this action 
was ultimately good” or “that action was ultimately bad”, this approach gives us no insight 
into the moral character which is the target of our investigation. From this approach it 
makes as much sense to say that Mr Frost has a morally good character based on the 
consequences of his actions, as it is to say a tree has a morally bad character for falling 
over and crushing a home. 
 This paradox is a result of what I will call “consequential absolutism”. I use this term 
to differentiate between it and a softer form of consequentialism. This softer form allows 
the second objection to the Frost problem above: Mr Frost is only morally responsible for 
the consequences that he could reasonably foresee. 27 Of course now we are 
incorporating some measure of intent, so why do we call this a form of consequentialism? 
Because, at least when applied to animals and other consciousnesses that have great 
hurdles in communication, our moral estimations are intimately tied to the success of the 
concerned actions – recall our nomads and chimps earlier. 
  Of course, one might argue in the other direction, that consequences have no 
bearing on morality, but that intent does, which can only be truly revealed through 
language. This would mean that behavioural studies have lost a lot of their impact, since 
we are only viewing behaviours and from them inferring intent. This may fall under the 
banner of anthropodenalism which was discussed at the beginning of this chapter. I will 
not re-tread the same ground here, but I will make this rebuttal: to accept the above 
argument is to imply a form of solipsism. 
 My rebuttal is based on the question: what is the nature of speech? Why do we hold 
human language in such high regard over the barks of a dog, or the information-rich scent 
of a gazelle’s glands? We may quite confidently state that human languages are far more 
                                                             
27 This line of thinking is endorsed by the judiciary, referred to as “the test of negligence” (Green, 1928: 
1029). 
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complex, and capable of more creativity and adaptability than the instinctive languages of 
animals – although one could go further and say we simply don’t know how complex, 
creative, or adaptive a dog’s bark is, since we are not dogs. However I do not believe I 
need to go so far to defend my rebuttal. At the root of it, human speech is simply another 
observed behaviour.  
One’s understanding of a state of affairs is never completely divorced from inference 
made from behaviour. Consider how often a speaker makes some error in their speech, 
and we almost unconsciously “patch it up” in our own minds for them so as to understand 
what is being said (Cummings, 2005: 98-99). This is especially true if one considers the 
uniqueness of each communicating mind. Nearly every word carries its own connotations, 
its own memories, and its own impact, such that an utterance made by one and heard by 
another will never result in identical hermeneutical horizons. For there to be meaningful 
communication, there must always be some measure of inference, from tone, posture, 
facial expressions, or even eye contact. Inference in language is largely possible thanks to 
observation of behaviours. 
The core of this rebuttal, however, is that speech is merely another observed 
behaviour. Faster, more detail-rich than reaching for a fruit, more adaptable than a hug, 
but a behaviour nonetheless, from which we read the intentions of others. Sometimes, as 
in other “bodily” behaviours, we project our own meaning over the other’s. But to claim that 
there is an unbridgeable divide between human and non-human minds on the basis that 
the latter lack human-style speech is to ultimately admit that you cannot know that there 
are other intention-capable minds beyond your own. While this may be an intellectually 
interesting position to debate, for all pragmatic purposes it is useless navel-gazing. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I had three aims. First, to provide a compelling case that, contra the 
dominant view in animal studies, non-human animals are capable of moral capacities. This 
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was argued through the discussion with the concept of anthropodenialism, the reluctance 
to see attributes generally considered to be “owned” by humans as being present in 
animals. The reluctance to do so, and the strategies employed to avoid 
anthropomorphism, reduce our own explanatory and predictive powers.  
My second aim was to broadly delineate the three properties necessary for a being to 
belong to a moral community. These properties are true-altruism, perspective taking, and 
targeted helping, with the second being a prerequisite for the third. Altruism demonstrates 
that the subject has the capacity to engage in a moral community – it holds “currency” for 
trade if we return to my earlier analogy of an economic community. Perspective taking 
gives the subject potential to engage with other members of the moral community, and 
targeted helping demonstrates the fulfilment of that potential. Without these two properties 
a subject cannot truly be a member of the moral community as its moral actions will be too 
limited. 
“Altruism” was the preferred concept of discussion here as it is by definition a publicly 
observable act, open to study and scrutiny. “Morality”, by contrast, includes private 
deliberations, emotions, and the avoidance of immoral actions which are harder to study 
with non-communicating subjects. This discussion was limited to altruism for practical 
reasons, but ideally ought to be about the moral capacities of others, and not simply the 
behaviour of altruism. 
My third aim in this chapter was to argue that being reliant on behavioural studies is, 
while not ideal, both necessary and rational. To deny this would force one to concede a 
form of solipsism, as not only is most communication between humans based on body 
language, but spoken languages are themselves nuanced behaviours reliant on 
interpretation. 
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In the next chapter, I will be presenting an exposition of my metric for moral 
consideration. However, before moving on I would like a moment to restate that, while the 
entire chapter was reserved for the discussion of animal morality, this metric is not limited 
to the animal rights debate. It is a metric which ought to work with any conscious being, 
and the concepts and principles laid down in this chapter are general. A machine 
intelligence, for example, would still need to exhibit altruism, perspective taking, and 
targeted helping if it is to be considered a member of the moral community. A brief 
treatment of the metric beyond animals will be given in Chapter 5. 
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4. The Metric and Moral Communities 
4.1 Introduction 
At the heart of this thesis is a pragmatic claim, which is to say that it is a prescription for 
selecting the most useful course of action, moral or otherwise. This is not the same as a 
utilitarian claim, which advocates the maximum benefit, happiness, or minimum suffering 
depending on which school of utilitarian thinking one subscribes to (Driver, 2009). A 
pragmatic claim is one which ideally aims to be maximally useful, to maximize our powers 
over our own lives. To a certain extent then, a pragmatic claim is an economic claim. 
Benefits may be derived from this usefulness, and happiness from benefits. But this is first 
and foremost a claim about usefulness. In this chapter I will, however, also offer a 
secondary, utilitarian claim which is dependent on the first pragmatic claim.  
I consider the utilitarian claim secondary as it is dependent on certain facts of 
history and economics which are in flux and so only hold true at a particular point in time. 
The first claim, the pragmatic claim, will always hold true. That which might change with 
time is the necessity of having a high degree of usefulness. In times of extreme excess, 
pragmatic claims which stress the importance of practical consequences– or of power to 
speak very broadly – might seem barbaric or antiquated. Should we ever achieve a world 
free of want, I would not be surprised if all discussions such as this are relegated to the 
history books; not because they are no longer true, but because they are no longer 
relevant. However, so long as we need to make choices about where and how finite 
resources are allocated, pragmatic arguments will continue to be relevant and they will 
continue to be important. 
This chapter will begin with a discussion of two pragmatic claims, followed by the 
secondary utilitarian claim. The discussion will also suggest a tertiary claim on the 
metaphysics of morals, which I will afford a short discussion. I will then close the chapter 
with a discussion on some possible objections to my thesis. 
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4.2 A claim, three arguments, and an observation walk into a bar… 
Before I begin constructing my argument, I would like to reiterate the two most pertinent 
points argued for in this thesis thus far. First, morality is not entirely either emotional or 
rational. If you exhibit an inability for complex thinking, or have a deficient IQ or some other 
cognitive disorder, then that does not necessarily mean that you are immoral, non-moral, 
or less-moral than another who does not have those traits.28 An “evil genius” may be a 
cliché, but it is not an oxymoron. Second, to be a moral being is not in itself sufficient to 
belong to a moral community, you must be able to incorporate and assist the rest of the 
moral community in your moral considerations. In other words, in order for the moral 
community to exist there must be “trade”, to once again return to my early analogy of an 
economic community. 
At last we come to the primary pragmatic argument: 
1) Beings which are capable of morally considering others ought to be included in a 
moral community. 
2) Membership to this moral community carries with it certain rights and privileges, 
principally the second maxim of the Kantian imperative that they should never be 
treated merely as means, but only as ends in themselves.29 
3) Additionally, these rights and privileges of members take precedence over those of 
non-members. 
Let us pause for a moment and consider the intentional usage of the term “beings”, 
although it should not come as a surprise after reading the first and third chapters of this 
thesis. Any person, animal, alien, or intelligent machine who has demonstrated the 
capacity for moral concern may be brought into the moral community; as per the 
                                                             
28 Having a lack of emotion is another matter, and will be discussed in section 4.4. 
29 I use the Kantian imperative somewhat reluctantly, and I acknowledge that “certain rights and privileges” is 
terribly vague. The discussion of these issues is in section 4.3. 
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discussion in Chapter 3, we should be able to acknowledge that morality is not an 
exclusively human trait.  
I have also refrained from using the term “species” (we might speak of alien 
species, species of machine intelligence etc.) for two reasons. First, the aggregate 
capacities of a species does not exist as an absolute rule for every individual. Humans are 
generally speaking morally capable beings. Yet there are individual exceptions, such as 
psychopaths or the arbitrarily cruel, who would be denied access to the moral community. 
One should not be given a free pass simply because the people to your left and right have 
the necessary prerequisites. That being said, it is eminently practical to operate on a 
species-by-species basis until individuals distinguish themselves otherwise.  
The second reason to not use the term “species” stems from the initial intent of this 
thesis to present a non-speciest thesis. This has proven to be a herculean task as all 
research in biology, ethology, and primatology is steeped in the language and thinking of 
the speciest distinction. I must, however, concede the usefulness of this distinction. We 
cannot expect some lone honeybee to overnight sprout an anterior dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and all the other neurological and morphological panoply 
needed for it become recognizably moral. So, while this argument is not strictly anti-
speciest, it is not wholly speciest either. Lines are not drawn arbitrarily by the taxonomy of 
species, but rather by the moral capacities of the given individuals and species. 
 But of course we can ask: why ought we to do this? Why construct this moral 
community at all? I will stress again that this is not an argument for moral desert. You are 
not a member of the moral community because you are good and good ought to be 
rewarded. We should not endorse the moral community out of the expectation of a sense 
of approbation or moral pride. Rather we ought to do this on the basis of the economically-
minded principle of reciprocity. To put it clinically:  
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4) We should do this to maximize our return on investment.  
The “we” and “our” here does not point, as it usually would, to humanity. Rather it points to 
the moral community itself30, which may exist even if there are no human members. 
 For a simple illustrative example, let’s assume that all dogs are beings capable of 
moral concern, as well as targeted helping, while all cows are not. (This need not reflect 
reality for the purpose of the following example.) We are then faced with three options: 
treat the dogs and cows under the same category of “animal”, as outsiders to the 
community, which is more or less the current norm, although of course there are 
differences across cultures; dogs are eaten in traditional communities in China and Korea 
while cows are revered in India and so forth. Or we could treat everyone as having equal 
rights to ourselves, as some moral theorists argue we should; think of, for example, 
Masolo’s “boundless society”31 (2002: 566-567), Goodpaster’s “to be alive is to be equal” 
(2013: 384-385), and Singer’s “to suffer is to be equally considerable” (2002: 17). Or, we 
could distinguish between dogs and cows on the basis of their aforementioned moral 
differences, treating dogs as a part of our moral community but not cows. 
 In the first case, dogs would have the capacity to contribute to the moral community 
but might not be able to realize that capacity. They could, like de Waal’s helpful 
chimpanzee, identify needs and concerns of others, and help to answer them. They could, 
that is, if dogs are given the rights and freedoms necessary to be fully capable of 
exercising their abilities. The dog cannot come to the aid of a mugging victim if, as a result 
of its non-member status, it is kept in a cage. This option wastes the positive social 
potentiality which dogs possess in our example. 
                                                             
30 This phrasing suggests that I assume that both I, the writer, and you, the reader, are qualified members. 
Neither case is necessarily true, but I will keep this phrasing for the ease of linguistic convention. 
31 Although it is worth noting that Masolo was more interested in a human boundless society, there is no 
reason why his arguments could not be applied to non-humans. 
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 In the second option, the rights of both dogs and cows are respected. The dog is 
now free to assist the mugging victim, and the cow is free to go about minding its own 
business. The moral community profits, some might argue, while non-members are 
unaffected. However, granting equal consideration of rights to others is not a cost-free act. 
The bodies of cows are extremely useful, and are used in much more than the food 
industry. They are used in the creation of glass, adhesives, gelatines, plastics, fertilizer, 
nitro-glycerine, phosphorus, a wide variety of medicines including antibiotics, insulin, 
multivitamins and many other products (Centre for Disease Control, 2013; European 
Medical Agency, 2013; Klinkenborg & Modica, 2001; Robertson, 2004). To no longer use 
their bodies as a means to an end would mean the surrender of a plethora of useful 
resources, all for no return on investment.  
Furthermore, once they are ends in themselves, the millions of cattle on Earth today 
would need their own habitats of suitable size and nature. After all, we could not simply 
dump them in the Sahara and let them perish. It would mean that enormous tracts of prime 
agricultural land would need to be relinquished as cattle reservations. Regardless of 
whether this option is instated piecemeal or all at once, there will be substantial short and 
long-term costs attached, without any pragmatic return. 
 Were the situation reversed, and cows were capable of moral consideration and 
targeted helping, there would be an increasing, mutual reward as they are incorporated 
into the moral community which would offset the costs attributed to incorporating a species 
into the moral community. For our example at least, this is not the case. It stands then that 
until resources become sufficiently plentiful, equal rights and consideration for all beings 
will not be the most pragmatic course of action. 
 The third case is the option which I advocate for in this thesis: dogs are brought into 
the moral community while cows remain outsiders. Under these conditions, dogs would be 
able to maximally contribute towards the moral community, enriching it for others as well 
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as themselves. Additionally, the usefulness of cows is not lost without recompense. This is 
not to say that incorporating the dogs in the moral community is without cost. Various 
legal, social, and economic restructuring would need to take place, similar to the situation 
with the cows discussed above. However, the costs of restructuring would be limited, 
once-off costs, while the reward of mutual assistance – of moral trade – would be ongoing 
into perpetuity. 
 A reading of this argument may give the impression that members of the moral 
community are “doers”, since membership is predicated on one’s ability to act in certain 
ways, and outsiders are “resources” for members to exploit as they see fit. However, being 
an outsider to the community does not relegate one to the status of object. While it is true 
that this argument advocates that outsiders may be used as a means to an end, their 
usage must still be justified. After all, a member causing unjustified suffering would 
indicate a potential lack of moral capacity which would flag them for possible expulsion 
from the moral community. 
 There is also a second pragmatic argument in support of my conception of the 
moral community. It is that beings capable of moral concern for others are capable of self-
policing their actions. Beings not capable of this pose an unmediated threat to others, and 
would require the expenditure of resources to monitor or otherwise restrain them to protect 
others. This is not to say that members of the moral community are incapable of harming 
others – fits of rage or greed or desperation can push anyone to committing a crime. 
However, a well-adjusted individual does not require the same wary eye as a psychopath 
warrants. The moral community would provide the grounds on which we make such a 
decision as to who ought to be watched and who ought to be left to self-police until proven 
otherwise. 
In short, equality under law assumes the law is being applied to those who are 
equal in nature. The right to freedom exists as it is at first assumed that all have the 
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rational, emotional, and moral capacity to responsibly exercise this right without harming 
others. Again, this does not relegate outsiders to the moral community to living in gibbets – 
recall the above discussion regarding unjustified harm – but it does mean that freedom is 
not an inalienable right for them. This is not necessarily true for all rights of course. A 
proponent of the right to life as an ultimate right may argue that there is no responsibility 
tied to that right, and it may never be violated. A closer examination of rights in the moral 
community is provided in the next section. 
The secondary utilitarian argument that I want to make is that indiscriminate 
altruism with finite resources is sub-optimal, and favouring altruism towards members of 
the moral communities optimizes the utility of available resources.  
For a stark example of what I mean, imagine that in the near future the ambitions of 
politicians have finally pushed the world over the edge, and left it a charred, lifeless 
wasteland. Fortunately, NASA had constructed a massive, completely self-sufficient space 
station in orbit that is crewed by twelve astronauts. Unfortunately, construction was not yet 
completed when the bombs fell, and even after all the ingenuity the crew could muster, the 
space station can barely produce enough food to sustain eight people. To equally share 
their food would only grant the astronauts a very slow death. Four must die and the 
astronauts must discriminate amongst themselves to decide who will live. They might 
make the decision based on sex, arguing that women are far more valuable in 
reproductive terms, or on their respective skill sets, or some other practical criteria. The 
point is, when resources are lacking neither indiscriminate altruism nor random selection 
should appeal to the utilitarian. 
But the above scenario does not fully capture the argument for the moral 
community. Members are members because of their capacity for concern and their ability 
to in some way contribute to the community. Resources spent sustaining and aiding a 
member are an investment towards that member returning in kind with their own skills and 
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resources. An outsider will have no compunction in consuming the resources given, and 
then ignoring the needs of others. In this case, unless the members have some way to 
compel an outsider to assist, the outsider becomes a veritable black hole of valuable 
resources. In times of scarcity members of the moral community have justification to not 
afford the needs and rights of outsiders equal consideration. 
Finally we come to the third claim. The claim is that when we judge someone to be 
evil, we do so not only on the single dimension of “goodness”, but also on their ability to 
include deserving others in their moral concern. This is not so much an argument towards 
the creation of a moral community so much as it is an observation that we already have an 
intuitive sense of its essential structure. This observation is based on our answer to the 
question, “When do we call someone evil?”  
Like the discussion on the moral domain in the second chapter, this is not so much 
a question of specific acts, as we will find little in common across cultures. A Christian 
extremist may say that the pornography industry is evil, while a libertarian may say that 
book-burning is evil, and both will think the other is wrong. Rather, this is a question of the 
meta-rules which inform our deliberations before coming to the conclusion of a person’s 
goodness or evilness. 
Let us take the case of the happy slave. In this I do not mean some absurd Uncle 
Tom fantasy. The widespread brutality and outright injustice of slavery in not something to 
be made light of. But we can imagine a slave owner, the son of a Roman senator perhaps, 
who is soft-hearted and has never taken a liking to beating or otherwise mistreating the 
slaves of his household. The day eventually comes when his father passes away and the 
slaves, seen as possessions, are bequeathed to the kindly son in the senator’s will. The 
son, very much a product of his family and culture, does not free his slaves, and continues 
to see them as objects which he owns. 
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His slaves have no freedom, they must obey his every order, subject to Roman law 
they would be crucified should they try to run away, they may still be traded at the forum, 
indeed their very bodies are not their own. And yet under the care of the son there is no 
unjustified punishment, and are generally well kept so long as they play the role of the 
good slave. 
From our modern, liberal perspective we might call the son evil. We say so not 
because the son has no moral capacities, or lacks empathy, but because he has not 
extended his community of equals to those who are deserving of being included. The 
judgement of “evilness” then, is not on the single dimension of moral capacities but also on 
the dimension of moral inclusion. Since the days of Imperial Rome the rules which dictate 
whether one is morally included have changed, leading us to judge the son to be evil. 
In the case of the senator’s son, the grounds for inclusion are arbitrary: You are not 
my equal because you are a slave. This is no more arbitrary than to say you are not my 
equal because you are not human. We can see an echo of this throughout history. You are 
not my equal because you are female. You are not my equal because you are 
homosexual. Of course, we must be wary of not falling into this cycle of thinking: any of 
these distinctions would be non-arbitrary if they necessarily implied a consequence which 
would justify exclusion from equal treatment: recall Fjellstrom’s definition of speciesism in 
the introduction to this thesis. 
We have an intuitive grasp that not all can be treated equally, that not all ought to 
be treated equally. The question is as to where the line is drawn. To base our grounds of 
inclusion upon moral capacities maximizes our return on investment of finite resources, it 
would utilize self-policing to make efficient use of available resources, and it would support 
a system where resources are spent on those who can be of future value to others. To do 
otherwise would either be an inefficient use of available resources, or even an outright 
waste. 
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4.3 Means, ends, and rights 
I have argued that the capacity for moral concern coupled with the ability of targeted 
helping are the necessary and sufficient grounds to be considered a member of the moral 
community. The moral community then endows its members with “certain rights and 
privileges, principally the second maxim of the Kantian imperative that they should never 
be treated as means only, but also as ends in themselves” and these members take 
precedence over non-members. I argued we ought to do so on pragmatic and utilitarian 
grounds. I will now focus on a more nuanced exploration of these rights and privileges.  
 In the original outline of this thesis, the analogy made between a moral community 
and an economic community was much stronger; members held the “currency” of moral 
behaviour, traded through the process of targeted helping, in exchange for access to moral 
resources. Unfortunately, due to time and space constraints, a discussion that would 
define “moral resources” to a sufficient degree is beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus, the 
second maxim of the Kantian imperative of ends and means and “certain other rights” 
have been used as a provisional placeholders. To this end, I do not consider this 
discussion to be either complete or totally satisfactory, and it is certainly an area for future 
work. Instead of a clear and concise argument, the objective of this section is to act as a 
marker, a guide for later expansion and improvement. 
 The first question one might ask is, why make use of the Kantian imperative at all? 
As I have repeatedly stated, I am making a pragmatic claim while Kant was making a 
deontological claim (Johnson, 2008). There is, however, an important pragmatic 
consequence to being treated as an end rather than a means. Being defined as a means 
implies an immediate curtailment of one’s freedom. In order to achieve some end, another 
has imposed their will upon your freedom for you to be utilized as needed. This may 
prohibit you, a member of the moral community, to act as you are morally compelled to do, 
and thus threatens the integrity of the moral community itself. In order to avoid a self-
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destructive contradiction, members of the moral community must be treated as ends in 
themselves, and never simply as unwilling means. Furthermore, the moral community is 
construed in such a way that the end benefiters of the system are the constituent 
members. That is to say, the objective of the entire project is for the community members 
to be ends themselves; to include the Kantian imperative is both an act of surety against 
abuse and a natural incorporation given nature of the community. 
 It should be pointed out that the usage of the Kantian imperative is not without 
difficulties. Kant’s exact formulation of the second maxim is as follows: 
Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every 
 other, always at the same time as end and never merely as means. 
(Kant, 2002: 46-47, emphasis added) 
The problem arises in that Kant specifically states that one cannot use one’s self as a 
means to an end. However, the very concept of the economically based moral community 
is predicated on the fact that members would be willing to allow themselves to be used as 
a means to others’ ends. Indeed this detail of the imperative seems to contradict intuitive 
notions of moral actions, and certainly the emotivist understanding of morality discussed in 
Chapter 2. If I use myself to shove another person out of the way of a speeding car, have I 
performed an immoral act in using myself as a means to an end? To use oneself to the 
benefit of another is very much the template of a morally commendable act. 
 An advocate of the Kantian imperative might argue that significant moral weight is 
assigned to performing a duty such as saving or assisting another (Kant, 2002: 13) and 
that this overrides the clause in the second maxim. However, if that is the case then why 
include the clause in the maxim at all? Of course, Kant does specify that one cannot be 
used as a means to an end only, since a student uses a teacher as a means to an end, for 
example? While this may cover most cases, the speeding car example above may still 
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prove problematic. If we assume the act kills me, have I now reduced myself to a means 
only, since all further possibilities of my life have been eradicated in service to this act? To 
sidestep this issue, as the maxim applies to the moral community, I will simply remove the 
clause. Members of the moral community may always voluntarily use themselves as a 
means to an end32. 
 Before entering into a discussion of the specific rights which members of the moral 
community are endowed with, it is important to note that not all members will necessarily 
have the same rights. In the previous section I argued that rights are only extended to 
those who can responsibly exercise them. As Singer points out, it makes no sense to 
extend the right to vote to dogs as they could never understand the act of voting or its 
significance (2002: 1-2). These rights fall under one of two categories, the first of which I 
will refer to as “incidental rights”, not because they are inferior or are dependent on others, 
but because they do not relate to the functioning of the moral community. Conceivably, 
there is no reason why in principle the moral community cannot function in an autocracy 
just as well as in a democracy.  
The second category of rights are “necessary rights”, that is they are rights which are 
necessary for the creation, maintenance, and optimum functioning of the moral 
community. For example, the right to life and its preservation would be classed as a 
necessary right. The moral community exists by virtue of the individuals who populate it. 
To exclude rights of this nature would not only be self-destructive to the moral community, 
but would limit the moral community’s efficacy, as the members are both benefiters and a 
class of resource from which the moral community derives benefits. It is these necessary 
rights which this discussion will be centred upon; however, one should keep in mind that 
this discussion does not entail exhaustive list of all rights.  
                                                             
32 This may be very similar to Kant’s formulation, especially where duty obligates us to use ourselves as 
means. However the explicit statement here discourages any possible misinterpretation of the maxim as it 
applies to the moral community. 
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 While presenting my argument in the previous section, I alluded several times to the 
fact that members of the moral community have a right to freedom, specifically the 
freedom of movement. This is a necessary right for members to have in order for them to 
perform the acts required of them to belong to the moral community in the first place. One 
cannot engage in targeted helping if you are restrained from doing so.  
For the same reason, freedom of expression may be included as well. Targeted 
helping should not be narrowly defined as entailing an act of physical strength. Teaching, 
soothing, debating, encouraging and many other acts of targeted helping are performed 
with utterances, gestures, and writing. Furthermore, the moral community itself will be in 
need of constant revision. Should marmosets be allowed membership? Should we expand 
the rights awarded to non-members, given some new abundance of resources? Questions 
such as these are not answered by a central authority. Rather, it is both the duty and 
privilege of members to maintain the moral community, and this is best performed when 
dissenting voices have the freedom to be expressed and heard. 
 For the optimal functioning of the moral community, members should also be 
granted a right to training. I use the term “training” to differentiate it from the right to 
education. Education is usually meant as formal education in literacy or whatever 
curriculum the state has defined as a minimum standard. The right to training is a right 
intended to ensuring that the potential skill of a member is fulfilled. Since potential will vary 
between species as well as individuals – it makes no sense to teach a dog algebra – and it 
cannot include a minimum standard for all members as a right to education does. 
Furthermore, the right to training is specifically a teleological right; it has the stated goal of 
improving the economy and efficiency of the moral community. A right education, by 
contrast, does not necessarily include such a teleological dimension. Education may be an 
end unto itself, or be done to enrich life in a way that cannot be quantified or be of 
immediate use to others. These two rights may seem quite similar, and indeed probably 
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have considerable overlap, nonetheless I believe is important to define rights in this way 
so as to better delineate the scope of the moral community. Being a member of the moral 
community does not necessarily grant you the wider right to education, and being a 
community outsider does not necessarily preclude you from that right. 
 The right to training is not unproblematic. Human beings can understand the goals 
and objectives of a training programme or a formal education system, and we may 
voluntarily choose to partake or abstain. Dogs or chimpanzees on the other hand raise an 
issue, as we cannot receive a meaningful sign of consent. Their training would be imposed 
upon them because it would be useful to the moral community – they would in a way be 
treated as means and not ends. 
 There are two possible responses to this issue, although neither of them is perfect. 
We can say that even human children are required to partake in some measure of training 
and education in any culture. Even the most obstinate libertarian must acknowledge that 
there are certain times where another must make a decision on your behalf and enforce it. 
Not all first graders are eager for school on a Monday morning, after all. To train members 
who cannot fully appreciate the goals and rewards of their training may be said to be akin 
to this. Alternatively, we can say that we do indeed receive some sign of consent from an 
animal in training. Labradors that gleefully chase decoys while being trained to be gundogs 
are at least in some way communicating their pleasure in being involved in the training, 
even if they do not actually understand all facets of the activity. 
 The problem with the first response is that sending children to school, even against 
their sullen will, is ultimately for their own benefit. They are still ends in themselves, as 
opposed to the right to training, where members are trained in order to benefit others. 
However, we might say that due to the reciprocal nature of the moral community, to help 
others is to help oneself; and therefore, in the long run the right to training is still to one’s 
own benefit. The problem with this response is that we risk conflating pleasure with 
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consent. It is pleasurable to eat Turkish delight, but that does not mean that I have given 
consent to be force-fed it. Although, again, we can say that the Labradors are voluntarily 
participating in their training and are not being catapulted after the decoys. We may say 
that we have implied consent of the trainee, and if we predicate this on the argument of 
interpreting intent from behaviour in Chapter 3, I believe we have a workable, if imperfect, 
solution. 
To summarize then: members of the moral community must always be treated as 
ends in themselves, even though they may treat themselves as a means. Whereas to use 
oneself merely as a means to an end is prohibited by Kant, it is a prohibition that I have 
disregarded as 1) it contradicts the understanding of morality presented in Chapter 2, and 
2) the moral duty attached to assisting others might be argued to supersede the 
prohibition. Members necessarily have the rights to life, to freedom of movement, to 
freedom of expression, and to the right to training. Furthermore, to ensure the integrity of 
the community and free moral action of its members, these rights supersede non-
members’ rights in the event of a conflict. These are rights are not necessarily exhaustive, 
but are intended as a guide for future work and expansion. 
4.4 Clearing the air: responding to possible objections 
In this section I will respond to five possible objections that might be raised against the 
moral community as I have described it.   
The first objection is that since membership to the moral community is effectively 
predicated on the ability to contribute, those who cannot contribute, such as babies, the 
autistic and so forth, would be excluded. This exclusion might seem unfair or even morally 
reprehensible, and thus to endorse the moral community is to exclude yourself since you 
are endorsing a morally reprehensible act, and thus may not have moral capacities 
yourself. The second objection is that simply having the capacity for moral concern and 
targeted helping does not guarantee that the subject will contribute to the community. To 
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include them in the community would be not much different from including community 
outsiders who do not fulfil the prerequisites, and to exclude them would be to violate the 
conditionals upon which the moral community is built. The third objection is that in this 
thesis I have argued for the existence of “true altruism” in Chapter 3, but the moral 
community is established quite firmly on reciprocal thinking. This is problematic as at the 
microscopic, individual, level reciprocal treatment of others is insufficient for belonging to 
the moral community. While the moral community itself entails a system of reciprocity 
which may ask of its members, who are required to be capable of true altruism, to put that 
altruism aside in the interests of the group. The fourth objection is that the moral 
community contradicts itself on premise 2. The community, as a system, uses members as 
a means to an end. The fifth and final objection is that it is unclear as to what happens to 
psychopaths and others who cannot engage in the emotional dimension of morality such 
as machine intelligences, but subscribe to a strict, rationally-based social contract theory. I 
will now respond to each of these objections in turn: 
1. We will exclude those who ought not to be excluded, such as invalids, babies, the 
autistic, and the elderly. 
This objection is based on the moral grounds that the moral community bears an 
unacceptable cost in exchange for its pragmatism. It would thus follow that anyone who 
advocates for the moral community does not necessarily belong to the community, and all 
who would belong to the moral community would not necessarily wish to. However, this 
objection is born of two errors. First, it assumes that to be excluded from the moral 
community would entail the end to that being’s rights or some other egregious suffering. 
This is, however, not necessarily the case. Non-members would still have rights as suits 
their particular nature or political character33. These rights would still exist, but would be 
secondary to the rights of members in the event of conflicting rights. For example, an 
                                                             
33 Depending on whether these are natural or legal rights, respectively. 
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insulin-dependent diabetic’s right to life, if a member of the moral community, would 
supersede the relevant rights of the community outsider from whom the insulin is 
harvested. 
 Second, the criteria for membership to the moral community include the capacity for 
moral concern, and the capacity for targeted helping. It is not a question of how extensive 
these capacities necessarily are, as long as members are capable of considering the rest 
of the moral community. An elderly person or an invalid, for example, might not have the 
same capacity to help as a neurosurgeon or an Olympic power lifter, but as they are not 
completely incapable of the prerequisites, they would remain full members of the moral 
community. In addition, should it ever be discovered that people lose these capacities 
beyond a certain age, it would still be in the interests of the moral community to maintain a 
“retired” membership. To do otherwise would be for every active member to effectively bet 
against themselves for future care and consideration. Many of the motivations behind 
actions are investments in the future; squirrels store nuts for the winter, humans invest in 
retirement plans and so forth. Having a retired membership would capture this category of 
motivations, and members may support the moral community without fear of being left out 
after a lifetime of contributions. Should the above case become reality, it would be 
necessary to create this exception in the interest of maintaining the moral community. 
 Infants and people in vegetative states are a different matter, but can still not be 
considered to be sound counterexamples. The moral community is chiefly founded upon 
the concept of mutual assistance mediated through long-term investment strategies. With 
that in mind, the care and investment in infants should in fact be one of the primary 
concerns of the moral community. People in vegetative states might be considered in a 
similar manner, but this would vary depending on the specifics of the condition. Should 
their potential recovery be nothing short of a medical miracle, then expulsion from the 
moral community would be a rational course of action. Distress and emotionally-based 
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compulsion aside, this is reasoning similar to that used by people who maintain their loved 
ones on life support; they are banking on the possibility of recovery. 
2. Morally capable but apathetic beings – sullen teenagers, depressives, nihilists etc. – 
would be excluded. 
Again, this objection is based on the same error as above. So long as a being has the 
capacities, s/he has the membership. That being said, an apathetic member is not only a 
latent resource to the moral community, but a potential liability as well. In such a case it is 
very much within the interests of the moral community to motivate the apathetic and turn 
them into a contributing member. 
3. Chapter 3 acknowledges the existence of true altruism and is a requirement for 
membership, but the moral community itself is a reciprocal system. 
On the surface this may appear to be a contradiction; however, there are two errors here. 
Firstly, to say that true altruism exists in the natural world – as I argued it does in Chapter 
3 – and to then say that we must therefore structure our ethics around this would be to 
subscribe to the naturalistic fallacy. I am arguing for us to take control of this tool with 
which nature has furnished us and to make the most effective, pragmatic use of it. 
 Secondly, while the principle of reciprocity is central to the justification and 
functioning of the moral community, strict reciprocal altruism is insufficient for allowing one 
to be a member of the moral community. By “strict” I mean that altruistic behaviour ends 
the moment one party has the opportunity to act with impunity. If I work as a cashier, and I 
am only motivated by strict reciprocal principles, and I know that due to poor bookkeeping 
that I can steal from the register without being caught, then I would do so. This violates 
both the second pragmatic argument and utilitarian arguments for the establishment of the 
moral community as laid out in section 4.3. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
72 
 
 We can, however, say that the community morally operates at two distinct levels. At 
the microscopic, members-level, true-altruism is in operation, while at the macroscopic, 
community-level, reciprocal altruism is in effect. 
4. The moral community contradicts itself on premise 2. The moral community, as a 
system, uses members as a means to an end. 
This is a legitimate objection to the moral community as I have described it in this chapter. 
Nonetheless there are two possible defences, of which I prefer the latter. Firstly, while it is 
true members are used as a means by the moral community as a whole; they are 
simultaneously the ends to which the community is directed. This holds true even where in 
a particular time period member A is used34 to the benefit of member B, as the moral 
community is structured around the principle of reciprocity A may later benefit from 
member B or C. It is only in a temporally short-sighted view that it might be said that 
members are used as a means to an end.  
Moreover, the phrasing of the second maxim states that one must be treated as an 
end and “never merely as means” (Kant, 2002: 47, emphasis added). We might debate as 
to how far we can push this qualifier of “merely” a means, since members are means to 
their own ends; however, I would rather defer to the second defence: 
 The usage of the Kantian imperative is an imperfect compromise; as such, we 
should expect some inconsistencies. This particular inconsistency only holds at the 
system-level perspective. At the interpersonal level, members voluntarily use themselves 
as means to assist others, which as discussed in the previous section is not a violation of 
the edited Kantian maxim. 
                                                             
34 That is, member A voluntarily uses himself or herself as a means to an end. For a member to be an 
unwilling means to an end would be a violation of the rights and privileges afforded to members, rendering 
membership meaningless. 
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5. What happens to psychopaths and others who cannot engage in the emotional 
dimension of morality such as machine intelligences, but subscribe to a strict, 
rationally-based social contract theory? 
While not a direct objection, this question does raise a concern regarding the specific 
parameters of the moral community. I argued in Chapter 3 that emotions are fundamental 
to morality, and thus would be just as fundamental to a moral community. So why refer to 
a “moral” community at all? Why should this not be an endorsement of a rational 
community or a reciprocal community? After all, being clinically diagnosed as a 
psychopath does not guarantee that one will commit a murder or some other harmful act, 
and if we assume commitment to social contract theory, those in question could still form a 
reciprocal relationship with the moral community. 
 It should be first pointed out that social contract theory is grounded on the principle 
of reciprocity (Rousseau, 1895: 56, 73, 112; Binmore, 2004: 19; Sacconi, 2004: 5), and is 
thus subject to the same criticisms already given above for those who only adhere to 
reciprocal altruism. But there is an additional critique which can be added against 
emotionally incapable beings joining the moral community. The nature of a long-term 
investment strategy is such that it is not always foreseeable that one will eventually be 
rewarded for one’s efforts. This is especially so in the moral community, unlike in an 
economic community; the “return” on your investment will not necessarily be from the 
original target of your investments. It may be impossible to see how someone in a 
particular predicament could ever recompense you for your efforts; and so, from an 
absolutely rational perspective, there is no impetus to help. From a moral-emotional 
perspective, one might still help to either gain a sense of approbation or to avoid a sense 
of guilt or shame. 
 This reply is not completely satisfactory. While it is true that psychopaths, or beings 
who can only engage in reciprocal altruism, fail to answer the three claims delineated in 
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section 4.2, they are nonetheless of potential advantage to the moral community. 
However, as they subscribe to reciprocal tenets this advantage will be lost if they have 
nothing to gain in assisting the moral community. This would be particularly damaging to 
the moral community if we assume their reciprocal altruism is a result of a complex 
cognitive capacity which distinguishes them from other outsiders, as their cognitive abilities 
could be useful if properly harnessed. 
 There is an answer with the potential to solve this conundrum. If we were to replace 
the simpler member/outsider dichotomy with a more complex tiered moral community, 
emotionally incapable beings might still partake in at least some of the rights and privileges 
of full members in exchange for their assistance. There are, however several reasons why 
I have decided to advocate for the simpler of the two models in this thesis: A tiered moral 
community would only be satisfactorily described with the use of moral resources. 
Reciprocal altruism is not simply a case of “do this for me, and I do that for you” if “this” 
and “that” have vastly different costs in their performance, or if “this” and “that” can be 
found elsewhere at a lower cost. Moral resources would allow for a more nuanced trade 
than the current model, allowing for a tiered moral community that could fairly incorporate 
partial members. Also, the tiered structure itself is not without its own problems, more 
serious than that of inefficiency. It would necessitate a way of quantifying the degree of 
assistance the non-emotional being might offer, the degree and complexity of its social 
contract35, and these two factors would need to be translated in to a value equitable to the 
moral-emotional value for trade in exchange for moral resources. 
I believe that none of these problems are insurmountable, but solving them is far 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
                                                             
35 I.e. can the being only understand an immediate quid-pro-quo from a single beneficiary, or could it engage 
in long-term strategies with numerous and interchanging partners as with de Waal’s computing ape 
previously discussed in Chapter 3? 
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4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have stated that we ought to create a “moral community”, a grouping of 
beings who differentiate themselves from others as having the capacity for moral concern 
for others, and who are able to engage in targeted helping. I argued that we ought to do so 
for three reasons: we ought to do this as it increases our powers over our environment and 
our own lives (the first pragmatic argument), that we save resources via the utilization of 
self-policing tactics (the second pragmatic argument), and that as long as need is greater 
than supply there ought to be a prioritization of investment in accordance with utility (the 
utilitarian argument). I also discussed an observation on the manner in which humans 
pass moral judgment on others, that our judgment is based on a subject’s moral capacity 
and its inclusion of deserving others. This suggests that we already have an intuitive grasp 
of the essential features of the moral community. 
 I then discussed in more detail the benefits of membership to the moral community. 
In no sense are these benefits a matter of moral desert, but rather rights and privileges 
which either maximize the power of the moral community, or protect it from destruction. 
They are purely functional benefits, which is to say rights necessary to the existence of the 
moral community and do not include any rights that are incidental to the moral community. 
These rewards were described in terms of the second maxim of the Kantian imperative – 
that members are always an end in themselves and never merely a means to an end – as 
well as the right to life, freedom of movement, freedom of expression, and a right to 
training. I also stipulated that as a matter of necessity these rights take precedence over 
any rights an outsider might have. 
 This discussion was not unproblematic, some issues arising from the fact that the 
second maxim and the collection of rights and privileges were used in this model as a 
provisional replacement for the concept of “moral resources”, as a discussion of such 
resources would require more time and space available to be included in this thesis. 
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Acknowledging this shortcoming, I also included a short response to five possible 
objections one might have against the moral community. 
 In this chapter I alluded to several other moral theorists who have argued for 
alternate metrics for rights and consideration. In the following chapter I will be looking at 
their arguments and will consider whether their arguments are valid or whether their 
models are preferable to my own. 
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5. Denouement 
5.1 Areas for future research 
Due to the limited scope and available time allowed for this thesis, a number of issues had 
to be left either unaddressed or only partially discussed. It should also be evident that 
much of the discussion in Chapter 2 regarding the nature of morality is grounded on very 
recent neurobiological research, and has perhaps has not withstood enough genuine 
attempts at falsification for the findings to be acceptable to the majority of academics. For 
example, Fumagalli et al.’s experimental results were puzzling and at some points 
contradictory, with only cautious speculation offered in explanation. Furthermore, the exact 
role mirror neurons play in human empathy, if any, is still a point of contention (Cook et al., 
2014: 177). 
 In Chapter 2, I discussed the CAD triad hypothesis in support of a biological root of 
morality. However if it can be argued that not all altruism is equal, as I did in Chapter 3, 
can we not also ask if all morality is equal? The moral emotions of contempt and anger are 
theorized to function as a motivation to defend communal and individual integrity 
respectively, and thus they may have pragmatic benefits, but does moral disgust have the 
same usefulness? The answer to this question will shape the characteristics potential 
members will need to hold in order to belong to the moral community. 
 In my estimation, the most important area of research that would benefit this model 
would be research on the concept of moral resources. How might these be defined? Very 
loosely I would say moral resources are the generally unquantified costs attached to 
providing unreciprocated aid and upholding rights. But even accepting such a slipshod 
definition, the question arises, are all these resources traded in a finite, common currency? 
Is it ever possible to say that the capacity to share food is enough to earn the right to 
unlimited freedom of movement? The relatively simple dichotomy of community members 
and outsiders presented in this thesis sidestepped such problems, but at the cost of 
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nuance to the model. As was acknowledged in section 4.4, this loss of nuance led to a loss 
of efficiency, as those who can contribute in a limited way, and can also effectively strike 
or rebel in protest and thus become active liabilities to the community, are completely 
removed from the moral community. 
 Work that clarifies the concept of moral resources will open up another avenue for 
exploration, that of the possibility of a tiered moral community, which I briefly discussed in 
Chapter 4. The tiered moral community is a restructuring of the moral community where 
individuals such as psychopaths would have limited access to moral resources based on 
their contributions to the moral community. 
 The full implications of adopting my model of the moral community have also not 
been explored completely. In the introductory chapter, I alluded to the fact that the moral 
community could include machine or alien intelligences, just as much as animal 
intelligences. With regards to alien intelligences, Robert Freitas raises many relevant 
questions as to how we might relate to them, and tentatively suggests that aliens’ moral 
capacities should determine our relations (Freitas, 1977: 15-17). I believe my conception 
of the moral community would be sufficient to allow for this issue, but this question is 
deserving of more thorough analysis than can be provided here. 
 How a machine intelligence might be treated by the moral community is also a 
question deserving greater investigation. I have already argued in this thesis that moral-
emotional capacities are essential to the moral community. It then follows that how the 
machine is treated is entirely dependent on the nature of emotions and the machine in 
question. Under current computing architecture, can the emotions of rage, love, pathos, 
shame, or any other be emulated, if not outright produced? Is there an architecture that 
could ever do so? 
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 Finally, should it come to pass that this model is put into practice, written into law 
and enforced, the largest research project of all would be the cataloguing of those who are 
members, and those who are outsiders. In the illustrative example in Chapter 4, I assumed 
that cows to be outsiders, but are they really? Are dogs, horses, chipmunks, trout, iguanas 
or tens of thousands of other species outsiders? How might we need to restructure our 
societies to accommodate an influx – or expulsion – of so many species from our current 
circle of concern? 
5.2 Conclusions 
The original intent of this thesis was to create a non-arbitrary, non-speciest model for 
determining whether or not a being is worthy of moral consideration. Evolution and 
pragmatism were accepted as the operative paradigmatic points of departure. 
 Speciesist models, which are implicit in many of our laws and social customs, are 
arbitrary models. That said, it is apparent that the fields of biology, ethnology, and 
primatology are still steeped in the speciesist perspective. It follows that any thesis that 
wishes to base itself on such empirical work will need to adopt at least a quasi-speciesist 
formulation. While still making use of the species classification system, I have nonetheless 
endeavoured to avoid any egregious speciesist stances such as “humans first, always.” 
While I have used such pronouns as “I”, “you”, and “we” to refer to the members of the 
moral community, I wish to stress this was only out of consideration for easier reading. The 
pragmatic theory put forward in this thesis would still remain true even if no humans 
populated the moral community. 
 A legitimate objection to this point might be to say that of course humans will 
populate the moral community, as other beings petitioning for entry to the community 
would be judged by the parameters of human morality. Thus, human principles and 
understandings would still be held at the pinnacle of the moral community’s hierarchy. To 
counter this objection, a two-pronged response was prepared in the second and third 
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chapters: (i) to define the nature of the moral domain, and (ii) to untangle the concept of 
humanness and morality, respectively. 
 In the defining the moral domain my objective was not to provide moral prescripts: 
“This is morally acceptable, that is not”. Rather, it was to analyse the nature of morality 
itself. This was done on two fundamental and often debated continuums, emotive theories 
versus rationalist theories, and core versus veneer theories. On the former continuum, a 
review of a large number of fMRI studies conducted over the last decade has provided 
compelling evidence for a dual model of moral deliberation which Greene et al. (2010) 
advocated for. I argued for a stronger role of emotional forces in the deliberation process 
than Greene et al. provided. The pertinent implication being that a moral community is not 
synonymous with a rational or intellectual community. Indeed, the findings of Fumagalli et 
al. (2010) suggest that emphasizing rationality over emotionality may lead to cruel or 
criminal behaviour. 
With regards to the core versus veneer continuum, I argued strongly in favour of a 
core understanding of morality. That is to say, the meta-rules of moral behaviours are a 
product of evolutionary selective pressures and are largely hardwired into the brain. It 
would of course be as absurd to say that there is a “don’t steal gene” as it is to say there is 
a “nose-picking gene”. How those meta-rules are expressed, and which are dominant, are 
shaped by environmental factors. I discussed the CAD Triad Hypothesis and how it 
exemplified this. 
 To summarize, in Chapter 2 I argued for a dual process of moral deliberation, 
favouring emotive pressures. I also argued that morality is necessarily derived from certain 
inherent morphological and neurobiological structures, while sociological factors played a 
non-essential formative role. After all, as the primatologist Frans de Waal once observed, if 
we are not good at our core, how could a society ever spring forth to teach us morality in 
the first place? (Ross, 2009) 
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 With a clear conception of morality in hand, I proceeded in Chapter 3 to untangle 
the concepts of humanness and morality. Some contemporary theorists, such as Ayala, 
still insist that morality is strictly a human characteristic, and argue that to see any of these 
characteristics in animals is to commit the veritable sin of anthropomorphism – projecting 
human structures of consciousness onto non-human animals. Thus to clarify my 
subsequent arguments, I presented a case for a critical or rational understanding of 
anthropomorphism as formulated by de Waal, where it is permissible to project human 
traits onto animals if doing so increases our ability to predict their behaviour, and that this 
projection is always subject to change in the event of a superior projection or method. To 
do otherwise would be a disservice to our understandings of other animals, an act of 
anthropodenialism. Rational anthropomorphism was presented in opposition with 
emotional anthropomorphism. Emotional anthropomorphism which, contra de Waal who 
presented it in a negative light, I argued may play an important role in group identification 
and empathy. 
 Given rational anthropomorphism I investigated three case studies of altruism in the 
animal kingdom, with the aim of demonstrating that not all altruism is equal. The first was 
that of kin altruism in bees. Here I argued that while these animals performed altruistically 
in the biologically defined sense – acting in such a way that increases another’s chance of 
propagating their own genes while reducing your own – this is not true altruism – due to 
the close genetic relationship between the bees involved, their acts were in fact selfish 
acts. 
 The second case of altruism investigated was that found in birds, where a bird 
would give a reflexive warning cry of an approaching danger to its own flock. While this is 
indeed in line with true altruism – given empirical studies which show that birds flock as a 
mixture of families – I argued that in itself, the capability of true altruism alone is not 
enough to qualify one as a member of the moral community. There are two further 
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requirements: 1) a potential member also needs to have the ability to extend moral 
concerns to the rest of the moral community, which birds have not been found to do, and 
2) one must also be capable of targeted helping. 
 Targeted helping is the ability to identify the cause of distress in another, formulate 
a plan to alleviate that distress, and then attempt to execute that plan. This is exemplified 
in the third case study of a helpful chimpanzee witnessed by Frans de Waal, where an 
adult chimpanzee dragged a heavy tyre over to a juvenile’s niche after the adult had seen 
the juvenile fail to do so with her own strength. 
 The aim of this section was threefold: to put an end to any notion the morality is an 
exclusively human trait, to argue that there are different breeds of morality, and to outline 
the required capacities one would need to be a member of the moral community. These 
include a morality which supports an encompassing true-altruism – that is, a moral 
capacity which can have an unselfish concern for others who may be different or distant 
from the self – and that of targeted helping. 
 With these findings in hand, Chapter 4 dealt with the heart of the thesis: the moral 
community itself. The argument may be summarized as follows: 
1) Beings that are capable of morally considering others ought to be included in a 
moral community. 
2) Membership to this moral community carries with it certain rights and privileges, 
principally the second maxim of the Kantian imperative that members should never 
be treated as means, but only as ends in themselves. 
3) Additionally, the rights and privileges of members take precedence over those of 
non-members. 
And we ought to do these things because: 
4) This will maximize the moral community’s return on investment.  
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This return comes about through reciprocal assistance members of the community lend 
one another; through members self-policing their own actions; and through making 
maximum use of available resources for individuals who in the future may be in a position 
to contribute to the moral community. 
 I then provided a preliminary discussion as to what “certain rights and privileges” 
might encompass. Rights to life, freedom, and training are preferentially given to members 
as, not only would these serve as motivators for members to support the moral community, 
but crucially these rights in themselves serve the function of maintaining the moral 
community and of improving its efficiency. 
 This thesis has advocated a strong pragmatic position: by structuring our social 
order according to moral criteria rather than speciesist criteria, we will make more efficient 
use of available resources. Reading this from a relatively privileged, most likely western, 
perspective it might seem odd or even downright greedy to speak of society’s limited 
resources. But one does not need look far to find stark poverty in the world. This is not 
only for human beings but for a multitude of other species as resources such as habitat 
space and food sources are placed under greater and greater stress. This thesis is the 
proposal of a method to ease this increasingly fierce and extinctive competition among 
certain species, and to make better use of what we have, through moral criteria. Morality 
would never have evolved if cutthroat competition was always a superior method of 
survival. To limit the benefits provided through moral capacities by arbitrary barriers such 
as speciesism is irrational, disadvantageous, and impractical.  
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